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Abstract 
This paper examines the factors associated with Canadian firms voluntarily disclosing climate 
change information through the Carbon Disclosure Project. Five hypotheses are presented to 
explain the factors influencing management's decision to disclose this information. These 
hypotheses include a response to shareholder activism, domestic institutional investor shareholder 
activism, signalling, litigation risk, and low cost publicity. Both binary logistic regressions as 
well as a cross-sectional analysis of the equity market's response to the environmental disclosures 
being made were used to test these hypotheses. Support was found for shareholder activism, low 
cost publicity, and litigation risk. However, the equity market's response was not found to be 
statistically significant. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In recent years the growing trend of social concern over climate change has left a 
significant amount of uncertainty within the business community. Attitudes towards global 
warming have shifted from whether or not it is an issue to what should be done to mitigate the 
damages. This has left governments from around the world looking for answers. Inevitably this 
will lead to increased regulations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are believed to play 
a significant role in global warming. These GHG emissions are a by-product of the business 
processes used by many industries. The integral role these emissions have within the business 
process has generated concern in the investing community over how well frrms will be able to 
compete in a GHG emissions constrained environment. To answer this question, investors need 
information pertaining to firms' GHG emissions and how well it is positioned to make the 
transition to a new environment. 
Shortcomings in current disclosure regulations have investors looking for alternative 
means to force companies to disclose this environmental information. As the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA) points out in its Executive Briefing Climate Change 2008 
report, for many firms, the environmental disclosures being made through the CDP are required 
under Canadian Securities Administrators' National Instrument 51-102. However, even with this 
standard, environmental disclosures have been both inconsistent and biased (Li, Richardson and 
Thornton [1997]). These issues have helped to encourage institutional investors to seek new ways 
to gain the information they require. 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a United Kingdom's based not-for-profit 
organization, is one new wayl investors are pursuing. Formed in 2000, as a United Nations 
initiative, its mission is to gather and disseminate climate change information in an effort to 
1 Part XIX of the Security Act (Ontario) is a formal mechanism that allows for the forwarding of 
shareholder proposals to be added to the proxy for voting. The mechanism allows for the request for 
environmental disclosures to be forwarded to firms. 
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create a unified response against global warming2• To accomplish this goal it enlists the support 
of institutional investors. The CDP refers to these institutional investors as signatory investors. 
On February 1 of each year the CDP sends a questionnaire to the largest global companies 
requesting climate change information on behalf of these signatory investors. The results are 
accessible by the signatory investors as they are received by the CDP and publicly released 
between September and December. 
1.1 Problem 
The combination of the CDP and its signatory investors has formed a new global 
environmental corporate governance mechanism that has yet to receive a significant amount of 
academic attention. The CDP and the signatory investors have been highly successful at 
encouraging firms to disclose climate change information. The overall response rate to the CDP 
request was roughly 74% in 2008. This far exceeds previously reported rates of 10% for similar 
requests (Rojas, M'zali, Turcotte and Merrigan [2009]). This large difference in terms of success 
raises questions concerning management's motivation to disclose through the CDP. 
A second issue arises in the signatory investor's use of the information the CDP is 
acquiring. The signatory investors are the institutional investors that have signed the requests 
being made by the CDP. These investors are purposely requesting climate change information to 
be used in the investment decision making process. The request for the disclosures implies that 
the investors do not currently have access to the information. Therefore, if the information 
disclosed through the CDP is value relevant, we would expect to see a statistically significant 
market response based upon the new information. However, the current literature suggests that 
the information being provided by the CDP is not useful to investors (Kolk, Levy and Pinkse 
[2008]); this conclusion, however, was based upon characteristics of the data being provided 
2 What We Do. Carbon Disclosure Project. <https://www.cdproject.netjen-
USjWhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx.> Retrieved October 20, 2009. 
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rather than an empirical test of the value relevance. A test of the market reaction will help to 
estimate the value relevance of the information being disclosed through the CDP. 
1.2 Uniqueness of CDP disclosures 
The data provided by the CDP have several unique features that will add value to an 
empirical study based on environmental disclosures. Normally, environmental information is 
disclosed within an annual report or sustainability report (Stanny and Ely [2008]). Both of these 
types of reports go beyond the scope of climate change information. They include other relevant 
information that will impact an investor's decision making process. When environmental 
information is disclosed within annual reports, the financial information that is disclosed with the 
environmental information is likely to influence investors, while sustainability reports include 
environmental information that goes beyond climate change information. This makes it difficult 
to make inferences about one specific type of environmental information, such as climate change 
information, since any observed market reaction could be influenced by the other relevant 
information. However, the CDP collects and distributes ONLY climate change information. 
Furthermore, CDP releases its reports independent from the company's annual reports or other 
sustainability reports; this makes it easy to isolate the impact of climate change information. This 
makes the CDP's disclosures more valuable in the assessment of the impact of a specific set of 
environmental disclosures, since it is free from other confounding environmental or fmancial 
information. 
Furthermore, the CDP releases standardized questionnaires to firms and analyses the 
results to develop easily read reports. Since the questionnaires ask the same questions of each 
firm, it is possible to compare many of the disclosures across both industries and time. The 
Carbon Disclosure Project Canada 200 reports provide a summary table of climate change related 
actions firms have taken. Examples of these include: assigning board responsibility for the 
climate change issue, disclosing emissions levels, having emissions verified by a third party and 
having greenhouse gas emissions reduction plans. Since these disclosures create a set of indicator 
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variables, it is possible to use principal component analysis to form a continuous variable 
representing a firm's commitment to the climate change issue for disclosing firms. 
These environmental disclosures are also being promoted as a benefit, rather than a 
liability. The CDP encourages firms to disclose by framing the disclosures as an opportunity to 
distinguish a firm as being positioned to mitigate the risks associated with climate change and to 
take advantage of the opportunities being created. By emphasising the possible benefits, they 
draw attention away from the fact that emissions are pollution. Since the costs of this pollution 
are currently being externalized3, it is likely that society will eventually look to hold firms 
responsible for the damages. This would imply that GHG emissions create a contingent liability. 
Historically, attempts at increasing the level of contingent liability reporting have been met with 
resistance, as seen with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (F ASB) attempt to make 
changes to FASB Statement No.5 in 20084• However, the CDP's high response rate indicates that 
management is less resistant to disclosing environmental information in this positive light. This 
has created a different set of firms willing to disclose environmental information than has been 
previously studied. 
The CDP's data will also allow us to build upon our understanding of shareholder 
activism. The disclosures being made through the CDP are unique because they are being made in 
response to investor requests. The CDP represents a large number of institutional investors, and 
they request information from a large number of frrms. In 2008, the CDP represented 385 
investors and approached over 3,000 frrms. Furthermore, it gathers information from 66 countries 
around the world. This represents a form of global environmental corporate governance that has 
yet to receive a significant amount of academic attention. While the CDP does not use a formal 
3 The cost of GHG pollution can be viewed as the physical changes associated with climate change. These costs 
are considered as external since they will affect all of society. 
4 On June 5, 2008 FASB released an exposure draft proposing changes to FASB Statement No.5 which would 
change the requirements for a contingent liability to require disclosure. In its current form FASB 5 requires a 
firm to disclose contingent liabilities when they are probable and can be reasonably estimated. The proposed 
changes would require firms to disclose all contingent liabilities unless the probability of loss is remote. The 
proposal failed to pass after meeting with a considerable amount of resistance from industry. It is currently 
being rewritten. 
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mechanism such as the SEC Rule 14a-8, it has received considerably more success in terms of 
getting firms to disclose environmental information. Thomas and Cotter (2007) found SEC Rule 
14a-8 to be highly ineffective for social issues such as increased climate change disclosures. 
However, the CDP's overall success rate in terms of firms responding to its request was 
approximately 74% in 2008. The CDP also provides the percentage of each firm's ownership 
controlled by the CDP's signatory investors. While institutional investors have been credited as 
an important control mechanism, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) fmd that significant 
heterogeneity exists between institutional investors' objectives, tactics and success in terms of 
shareholder activism. This suggests that studies could benefit by being able to distinguish 
between active and passive institutional investors. By becoming a signatory investor, an 
institutional investor is identifying itself as an active investor. Therefore, the use of signatory 
investors, rather than all institutional investors, will create a clearer proxy for this aspect of 
corporate governance. 
The shareholder activism being displayed by the CDP and its signatory investors is public 
m nature. The request for information cannot be circumvented by management. Proposals 
forwarded through formal mechanisms such as SEC Rule 14a-8 have rules that allow 
management to remove the proposal from the proxy material if specific criteria are met. However, 
regardless of management's actions, the CDP approaches the largest firms by market 
capitalization. They cannot conceal the issue to avoid making a decision pertaining to the 
disclosures being requested. If a firm chooses not to disclose, the choice itself is made public. 
1.3 Objectives and Expected Contribution 
The first objective of this study is to develop explanations and testable hypotheses for 
management's motivation to disclose information through the CDP. Furthermore, the study will 
examine the characteristics which discriminate between disclosing and non-disclosing firms. The 
second objective is to examine the market reaction to the disclosures being made to determine the 
informational value of CDP disclosures. The third objective is to perform a cross sectional 
6 
analysis on the equity market reaction to examine the determinants of the market response and 
whether disclosures hold value to investors. 
This study is expected to extend our understanding of shareholder activism. By 
examining the factors that motivate a ftrm to respond to the CDP, we can begin to understand 
why this global environmental corporate governance group has received such a large increase in 
success compared to the shareholder activism performed by independent institutional investors. 
This information will be beneftcial to academics as well as active investors who wish to promote 
change within an organization. 
The ability to isolate active institutional investors will also extend our understanding of 
how institutional investors ftt into corporate governance. This information will be beneftcial to 
academics wishing to use institutional investors as a proxy for corporate governance. 
The remainder of the paper will be presented as follows: Section 2.0 Background and 
Literature Review, Section 3.0 Hypothesis Development, Section 4.0 Data Collection and Method 
of Analysis, Section 5.0 Empirical Results, and Section 6.0 Conclusions. 
2.0 Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Climate Change 
Climate change is deftned as a change in the state of the climate (mean or variability) that 
persists over an extended period of time. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
was established by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological 
Organization, it is the leading body for the assessment of climate change, and it stated in 2007 
that: 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level (IPCC, 
30) 
The IPCC has also stated that most ofthe observed increase in average temperatures is very likely 
to have been caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are manmade. Therefore, if further 
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damage to the climate is to be mitigated, it will require the altering of human behaviour. As things 
stand now, business is a large source of GHG emissions. This will target high GHG emitting 
industries, as society looks for ways to contend with the issue of climate change. There are many 
ecological changes associated with climate change. These changes will cause problems for 
businesses in a variety of industries, making climate change an important issue for ftrms to 
consider. 
The physical changes associated with climate change have the potential to affect many 
industries. Warmer weather is associated with wildftres and the spread of pests, which are 
destructive to crops. Both of these will have dramatic effects upon the agriculture industry. 
According to the NASA Goddard Institute, greenhouse gases are responsible for "a mean 
warming rate of ~0.15°C per decade,,5. Rising temperatures have already facilitated the spread of 
pine beetles which have been devastating to the forest industry. Extreme weather is another 
physical effect of climate change. For example, Hurricane Katrina caused $135 billion in property 
damage along the Gulf coast in 2005. Coastal areas also need to be concerned with the rising sea 
levels created by melting ice caps. Real estate investment ftrms need to consider the loss of 
property that will occur as the sea level rises. Cogan (2006) provides a good example of the 
implication this physical risk can have on long-term planning: 
a proposed $7 billion pipeline in Canada's Mackenzie Valley is dependent 
on permafrost, or frozen ground, as a supportive structure. When permafrost 
thaws, a process that has already begun, long-term investments in the 
pipeline will be at risk. (Cogan, 11) 
This example highlights the type of climate change threats with which businesses will have to 
contend. Projects that ftrms determine to have positive net present values could potentially lead to 
large losses if the dangers of climate change are not properly considered. 
Along with the physical implications of global warming, ftrms must contend with 
increases in regulatory risk, which could have cash flow implications as well. The Kyoto Protocol 
5 GISS Surface Temperature Analysis Global Temperature Trends: 2008 Annual Summation. Goddard Institute 
for Space Studies. <http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2008/> 
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is an example of how social concern has spilled over into the political arena. The Kyoto Protocol 
evolved from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is an 
international treaty focused on global warming concerns. The Protocol is a legally binding 
agreement that requires those countries involved to lower their emissions levels. It represents a 
globally unified political effort to bring emissions down to scientifically acceptable levels. The 
Protocol only requires the countries involved to lower emissions; while it does give advice on 
how countries can achieve these lower emissions, each country is free to pursue the goal in their 
own way. This leaves individual countries room to enact its own policies. 
Currently, regulations are very lax in Canada. While regulations require the mandatory 
reporting of greenhouse gases for companies that produce more than 100,000 tons6 of carbon 
dioxide equivalent units, there are no penalties or fmes for excessive levels. However, it is not 
very likely that regulations will stay this way. The Canadian government has already stated that it 
"is committed to developing and implementing a North American cap and trade system for 
greenhouse gases,,7. A cap and trade system would first quantify pollution levels by breaking 
them down into units. An acceptable level of pollution (the cap) would then be set. Companies 
with emissions levels lower than the cap would be able to sell unused units, while companies that 
pollute at levels exceeding the cap would be required to either buy additional units or reduce 
emissions. In this system not all companies would incur additional costs. In fact, if a company has 
low emissions levels, it could earn additional revenue streams through the sale of extra carbon 
units. 
Excessive polluters will also face reputation problems and potential litigation as the 
concern with global warming grows. Both litigation risk and reputational risk are closely tied 
together. As physical changes in the environment become more apparent and media attention 
grows, companies will have to contend with changes in social attitudes. This could potentially 
6 The 100,000 ton mandatory reporting threshold was lowered to 50,000 tons in the summer of 2009. 
7 Cap and Trade. Government of Canada. <http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/defaultasp?lang=En&n=8343927F-
1.> Retrieved November 5,2009. 
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affect businesses in many ways, depending on emissions levels and social concern. To begin 
with, given two equal products at the same price, consumers concerned with the environment will 
choose the alternative that is less harmful to the environment. As social concern grows, this could 
change from choosing the greener product to boycotting the firms with high emissions levels. The 
worst case scenario would involve lawsuits for the damages related to climate change. 
2.2 Carbon Disclosure Project 
The Carbon Disclosure Project is a United Kingdom based not-for-profit organization that 
formed as a United Nation's initiative. It enlists the support of institutional investors to advocate 
its environmental awareness agenda. This includes getting the largest global firms to disclose 
greenhouse gas emissions and action plans concerning climate change. The belief is that the 
disclosure of this environmental information will act as a quasi-regulation. Firms will improve 
their environmental performance rather than disclose poor performance results to avoid a negative 
reaction as evidenced by a change in share price. This theory that environmental disclosures can 
work as a quasi -regulation has gained empirical support from Konar and Cohen (1997) who 
studied firms' responses to disclosures labelling them as the "worst" polluters. They concluded 
that the firms that suffered the largest decreases in share value at the time of the disclosure had 
greater subsequent improvements to environmental performance than industry rivals. However, 
Konar and Cohen (1997) tested the market's response to a disclosure that was simple to 
understand. Kolk et aL (2008) claimed that, although the Carbon Disclosure Project has been 
successful in terms of getting firms to disclose environmental information, the information 
disclosed is too complex and not comparable enough to be useful for investors. 
At this point very few empirical studies have taken advantage of the data provided by the 
CDP. Kolk et aL (2008) examined the CDP from an institutionalization and corporate governance 
perspective. They discussed the CDP in terms of the strategies that are being used to change the 
focus of corporate governance to include climate change, and evaluated the success of the CDP's 
initiatives. They concluded that the CDP was successful in its effort to use institutional investors 
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to encourage companies to disclose environmental information. However, they also determined 
that the information being disclosed was not beneficial to investors on the ground that firms' 
responses to questions were not considered comparable. 
The other paper that uses CDP data was a study by Stanny and Ely (2008) which 
examined the factors that are associated with a firm's decision to disclose environmental 
information through the CDP. Their results pertaining to institutional investors' role in motivating 
firms to disclose climate change information contradict the fmdings of Kolk et al. (2008). While 
Kolk et al. (2008) attributed the success of the CDP in getting frrms to disclose information to 
institutional investors, Stanny and Ely [2008] found that there was no statistically significant 
relationship between disclosure rates and institutional ownership. The factors that Stanny and Ely 
(2008) found to be statistically significant were size, previous disclosures and foreign sales. Both 
of these papers followed very different methods of analysis. Kolk et al. (2008) compared the 
regional response rates from the CDP's Global 500 sample to the number of signatory investors 
with origins in each region. Stanny and Ely (2008) reached their conclusion by using institutional 
investors as an independent variable within a logistic regression. A firm answering the CDP's 
questionnaire was the dependent variable in the model. Stanny and Ely (2008) used the US S&P 
500 sample provided by the CDP. Therefore, differences in the results of the two studies could 
also be related to the samples used. There is overlap between the two samples (many of the US 
S&P 500 frrms are also listed in the Global FT 500 sample), but there were very different 
response rates. The Global FT 500 had a 77% response rate in 2007 while the US S&P 500 only 
had a 56% response rate. The different response rates suggest that there might be differences 
between the samples. 
While this study uses a similar methodology to the Stanny and Ely (2008) study, there is 
a key difference in the use of institutional investors as an independent variable. Stanny and Ely 
(2008) used institutional investors as a proxy for increased scrutiny. As Gillian and Starks (2000) 
point out, large shareholders that hold a large stake in a firm have motivation both to actively 
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participate in a firm's strategic direction and to monitor the firm's activities. It is the monitoring 
performed by institutional investors that Stanny and Ely (2008) were attempting to capture. 
However, as Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) point out, heterogeneity exists among institutional 
investors. Not all institutional investors will follow investment strategies that require the 
influencing of management's decisions or the monitoring of a firm. This study uses signatory 
ownership to proxy for the signatory investor's role in corporate governance. While each 
signatory investor's investment strategies are unknown, the act of joining the CDP identifies the 
institutional investor as an active investor. While all of the differences between institutional 
investors are not removed, this distinction allows for the identification of a group of known active 
investors. Since these investors are active, they will be more likely both to control and to monitor 
a firm's behaviour. This will translate into a cleaner proxy for institutional investors' role in 
corporate governance. 
The data provided by the CDP offers some unique opportunities for environmental 
disclosure research. Empirically testing the value of environmental information can be a difficult 
proposition. As Stanny and Ely (2008) point out, research studying the voluntary release of 
environmental information tends to focus on annual reports and sustainability reports (Ingram and 
Frazier [1980], Wiseman [1982], Hughes, Anderson, and Golden [2001], Hedberg and von 
Malmborg [2003], Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes [2004], Sahay [2004], Brammer and 
Pavelin [2006], Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari [2008], Hossain and Reaz [2007], Ans 
[2008]). Both of these reports are very broad in nature. They include information about all major 
sustainability issues, making inferences about specific environmental issues very difficult. 
Furthermore, annual reports include financial information and as Cormier, Magnan and Morard 
(1993) point out, any market reaction could be caused by correlated relevant financial 
information. The data provided by the CDP is information specifically related to the issue of 
climate change and the reports are released independent of annual reports or other financial 
information. 
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2.3 Motivation for Voluntary Disclosure 
In Akedoff's (1970) seminal paper on the market for lemons, he introduces the concept 
that information asymmetries between management and investors could destroy markets. Due to 
this information asymmetry issue, management will disclose information to distinguish their firm 
from the worst performing fIrms. However, this theory would indicate that a fIrm would always 
disclose inside information, a situation that does not account for the discretion displayed by 
management in their disclosure decisions. Due to this limitation, subsequent research introduced 
the concept of proprietary information (Verrecchia [1983]). Proprietary information can be 
defmed as information that by being disclosed can alter a fIrm's future cash flows. Dye (1985) 
includes information that could generate regulatory action or create potential legal liabilities 
among proprietary costs. Given the nature of the current greenhouse gas regulation environment, 
the information being disclosed through the CDP could defInitely be considered as potentially 
generating regulatory action. Therefore, the information being requested for by the CDP and its 
signatory investors can be considered proprietary in nature. As Healy and Palepu (2001) point out 
in their review of the extant disclosure literature, several studies have concluded that fIrms have 
an incentive not to disclose proprietary information when it will reduce their competitive 
advantage (Verrecchia [1983]; Darrough and Stoughton [1990]; Wagenhofer [1990]; Feltham and 
Xie [1992]; Newman and Sansing [1993]; Darrough [1993]; Gigler [1994]). Since the climate 
change related disclosures being made through the CDP are proprietary in nature, the anticipated 
lose of competitive position will be considered by management prior to the disclosing of the 
environmental information. 
2.4 Determinants of Voluntary Environmental Disclosures 
Previous environmental disclosure literature has examined the determinants of voluntary 
environmental disclosures from several perspectives. Patten (1992) examined social disclosures 
from a legitimacy theory approach. He studied the inter-industry change in environmental 
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disclosure patterns after the Alaskan oil spill and concluded that firms increased environmental 
disclosures to maintain legitimacy. Barth, McNichols and Wilson (1997) examined the 
motivations for firms with substantial superfund involvement to voluntarily disclose 
environmental liabilities. They concluded that the voluntary disclosure of environmental 
liabilities is influenced by regulations, litigation and negotiation concerns, capital market 
requirements and other regulatory influences. Li, Richardson and Thornton (1997) provide 
evidence that a firm is more likely to disclose environmental information as its propensity to 
pollute increases, outside knowledge of the firm's environmental liability increases and the costs 
of disclosing decrease. Brammer and Pavelin's (2006) study of environmental disclosures made 
by large UK firms conclude that larger firms with disperse ownership and lower levels of debt are 
more likely to make environmental disclosures. Stanny and Ely (2008) examined disclosures 
made by the CDP using factors related to the level of scrutiny a firm receives. They concluded 
that size, previous disclosures and foreign sales all influence a firm's decision to disclose 
environmental information. 
3.0 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Shareholder Activism: 
The CDP's use of the signatory investors to pressure companies to disclose 
environmental information can be viewed as the next evolution in shareholder activism. Gillian 
and Stark (2007) point out how shareholder activism has changed over time and acknowledge that 
shareholder activism could occur in a wide range of forms, stating that anything from the selling 
of ones' shares to a hostile takeover could be viewed as shareholder activism. Yet, their concept 
of changing shareholder activism only dealt with changes in the type of investors using 
shareholder activism and the issues being targeted for reform. They failed to consider any 
evolution within the form of shareholder activism itself. One possible explanation for why they 
take this stance is that the extant literature focuses on only one form of shareholder activism: 
shareholder proposals. The vast majority of studies examine shareholder activism in terms of 
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shareholders forwarding proposals to management with the intention of having them added to the 
company's proxy material (Ferri and Sandino [2009]; Thomas and Cotter [2007]; Gillian and 
Starks [2000]; Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999]). The material is then presented at the next 
shareholder meeting to be voted upon. Success of the shareholder activism is then related to how 
much shareholder voting support the issue received. These studies generally focus on institutional 
investor's use ofRu1e 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act. Rule 14a-8 was established to allow 
an investor to include a proposal in a company's proxy material. It is a means by which an 
investor can influence change within an organization. However, Rule 14a-8 is subject to a number 
of limitations. To begin with, an investor is only allowed to submit one proposal per firm each 
proxy season. Furthermore, management can remove the proposal if the same issue has been 
included in the proxy in previous years and failed to meet the required level of votes 8. While the 
evidence suggests that these shareholder proposals have been effective for corporate governance 
issues in the post-SOX environment (Ferri and Sandino [2009]; Del Guercio, Seery and Woidtke 
[2008]; Thomas and Cotter [2007]), social reform issues, such as environmental disclosures, have 
been considerably less successful. Thomas and Cotter (2007) found that environmental issues that 
made it to a finn's proxy for voting between 2002 and 2004 received an average of 10.79% of the 
votes with a standard deviation of7.5%. Not only do environmental issues fail to reach a majority 
vote, but whenever a shareholder proposal concerning environmental issues makes it to the proxy, 
it runs the risk of receiving too few votes to be accepted in future years. This makes Rule 14a-8 
highly ineffective for environmental issues such as the request for disclosures pertaining to 
climate change. Since an investor is only allowed to submit one proposal for each firm, a highly 
active institutional investor is likely to use Rule 14a-8 for an issue that has a greater chance of 
success. Institutional investors concerned with the implications of climate change have begun to 
B If the issue had been in the proxy for one of the last five years, it must have obtained a minimum of 3% of the 
vote. If the issue had been in the proxy for two of the last five years, it must have obtained a minimum of 6% of 
the vote. If the issue had been in the proxy for the three of the last five years, it must have obtained a minimum 
of 10% of the vote. 
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use a new form of shareholder activism as witnessed by the success of the CDP in terms of 
recruiting signatory investors. 
One ofthe key differences between the CDP's request for information and an institutional 
investor's use of Ru1e 14a-8 is the number of parties involved. Under Rule 14a-8, a single 
investor forwards a proposal to management. This initial proposal represents a one-to-one 
relationship. The CDP, on the other hand, sent the same request to over 3,000 firms on behalf of 
385 institutional investors in 2008. This represents a many-to-many relationship. Since the CDP 
publicly lists all of the signatory investors, firms are aware of the percentage of ownership that is 
requesting the information. Song and Szewczyk (2003) suggest that the added pressure of being 
targeted by a group of investors could enhance effectiveness in promoting change within the 
organization. The combination of investors will form a block that equates to a higher percentage 
of firm ownership than would be expected from a shareholder proposal being forwarded by a 
solitary institutional investor. This higher level of ownership will be more effective at influencing 
management. The first hypothesis is as follows: 
HI: The higher the percentage of signatory investor ownership, the more 
likely a firm will respond to the CDP and disclose environmental 
information. 
The percentage of signatory ownership is provided by the CDP within Carbon Disclosure 
Project Canada 200 reports that are distributed annually. This percentage of total signatory 
ownership (TOTSIG) is used to proxy for shareholder activism and it is predicted to have a 
positive coefficient. However, this signatory ownership block consists of both foreign and 
domestic ownership. Local investors have a better understanding of a firm's environment than a 
foreign investor. They will be aware of a firm's reputation within the community and have a 
better idea of the likely direction future regulations will take. This knowledge will make it 
increasingly difficult for a firm to justify the withholding of information. Therefore, firms with 
higher levels of domestic signatory investor ownership should be more sensitive to the pressure 
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being applied by the CDP to disclose environmental information. The second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: The higher the percentage of domestic signatory investor ownership, the 
more likely a firm will respond to the CDP and disclose environmental 
information. 
The CDP includes the domestic signatory ownership along with the total signatory 
ownership information in the Carbon Disclosure Project Canada 200 reports that are released 
annually. The relationship between the domestic signatory investors and management's decision 
to disclose climate change information was captured in two ways. The first logistic model ran 
included a variable containing the relative domestic signatory firm ownership. This variable 
(RelativeDOMSIG) was calculated by dividing the frrm's domestic signatory ownership by its 
total signatory investor ownership. The relative domestic signatory ownership variable was 
included in the logistic regression model which included total signatory ownership. The second 
means by which the domestic signatory investors' role in shareholder activism was captured was 
through a logistic regression model using the actual percentage of domestic signatory investor 
ownership (DOMSIG), as well as the foreign signatory investor ownership (FORSIG). The 
foreign signatory ownership was calculated by subtracting the domestic signatory investor 
ownership from the total signatory investor ownership. As with TOTSIG, it is predicted that 
RelativeDOMSIG, DOMSIG and FORSIG will all have positive coefficients. 
3.2 Signalling 
The disclosures made through the CDP are voluntary in nature. They go beyond the 
mandatory disclosures required by standard setting organizations. Furthermore, these disclosures 
are non-fmancial, environmental disclosures. The CDP's request for information is motivated by 
the desire to create a unified action against climate change9• Building upon the earlier work of 
9 "The Carbon Disclosure Project launched in 2000 to collect and distribute high quality information that 
motivates investors, corporations and governments to take action to prevent dangerous climate change." 
Excerpt taken from "What We Do". Carbon Disclosure Project. <https:jjwww.cdproject.netjen-
USjWhatWeDojPagesjoverview.aspx.> Retrieved October 7, 2009. 
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Salop and Scheffman (1983), Denicolo (2008) offers an explanation as to why ftrms would wish 
to overcomply with environmental regulations. Early adopters of "green" technologies used to 
lower emissions have an incentive to disclose through the CDP to signal to standard setting 
agencies that the cost of complying with stricter regulations is affordable. Denicolo (2008) 
developed a model in which regulatory overcompliance can be used as a signalling device. In the 
model, when three conditions are met, a signalling equilibrium forms where overcomplying ftrms 
will attempt to sway governments into passing tougher regulations. The three conditions that are 
required include: the signalling fum must be able to beneftt from the increased regulations; the 
stricter regulations can only be beneftcial if the costs associated with adhering to the regulations 
are not too high; and the regulation setting body must demonstrate an unwillingness to set the 
regulation without more information pertaining to its costs. 
Firms that have made commitments to lowering GHG emissions would beneftt from 
increased regulations in a variety of ways. These ftrms have made investments in technologies 
that reduce GHG emissions. These investments will place ftrms in a better position to contend 
with future regulations than competitors that have chosen not to make similar investments. 
However, the costs of emitting these gases are currently externalized. This is to say that the 
dangers associated with climate change are spread over the whole of society. In the current 
environment, ftrms that produce excessive levels of GHG emissions are neither required to pay 
ftnes nor forced to compensate injured parties. While there are still advantages to investing in 
"green" technologies in the current environment (i.e., lower energy costs, improved reputation), 
the investments represent costs that competitors that have chosen not to make similar investments 
have avoided. Increased regulations mandating the lowering of GHG emissions would force these 
competitors to make investments in "green" technology. This would raise the competitors' costs, 
beneftting the ftrm that is currently emitting lower levels of greenhouse gases. Firms with lower 
GHG emissions levels would also beneftt from mandatory reporting regulations. While the 
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climate change information disclosed through the CDP has continuously improved, there are still 
gaps in the disclosures that create comparability problems. The CDP acknowledges this flaw in 
its 2009 Investor Research Project. It points out that: 
there are still gaps in the data that hamper an investor's ability to fully integrate 
climate into investment decision making processes. (Mercer, 5) 
They proceed to credit this situation to the voluntary nature of the environmental reporting. 
Introducing mandatory reporting requirements would fill these gaps and allow investors to fully 
incorporate climate change information into investment decisions. This would be beneficial to 
firms that have invested in "green" projects. 
Furthermore, the signal sent by firms disclosing through the CDP is both credible and 
reliable. The disclosures being made through the CDP are a means to inform investors about the 
actions that a firm has taken to address the global warming issue. These actions that are being 
disclosed have associated costs. For example, making investments in technologies that wi11lower 
greenhouse gases emissions represents an additional expenditure beyond what would have been 
required had the firm not chosen to address the global warming issue. The cash flow implications 
of these actions related to climate change demonstrate the commitment a frrm has to the 
prevention of dangerous climate change and add credibility to the disclosures. The disclosures are 
reliable because they cannot be imitated by a "bad" environmentally performing firm. To start 
with, a "bad" performing firm will not have taken climate change related actions to disclose. 
However, more importantly, these frrms are not positioned to contend with future regulations. 
These firms are aware that future regulations will have adverse cash flow implications. This 
means they cannot signal the market that they are prepared for them, since the future regulations 
are not wanted. 
Unfortunately, a frrm's intention to use the CDP as a means to signal standard setters is 
not directly observable. However, the underlying intention of a firm using the CDP to signal the 
19 
market is to gain an economic benefit. Therefore, we would expect to see a positive market 
reaction to the release of the signal. 
H3 The announcement period Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) for firms that have disclosed information indicating their 
commitment to the climate change issue is expected to generate a 
positive and significant market reaction. 
Support for this hypothesis will be found through a cross-sectional analysis of the market 
response to the disclosures being made. The Carbon Disclosure Project Canada 200 reports issued 
by the CDP include a summary table which provides information pertaining to the actions a firm 
has taken to address climate change. These tables form a set of indicator variables. Eight specific 
climate change relevant actions were included for all years covered by our sample. These tables 
report whether or not the firm: assigned board representation for the issue of climate change; 
assigned a senior executive with responsibility for the issue of climate change; disclosed 
emissions data; followed third party protocol in the calculation of emissions; had emission data 
externally verified; took steps to prepare for future trading regimes; had a plan to reduce its 
emissions; and provided a formal plan with defined goals and timelines for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. Each of these disclosures represents a costly activity that demonstrates a firm's 
commitment to the climate change issue. It is this costly signal that the firm is committed to the 
climate change issue, common across all eight indicator variables, that will be used to proxy for 
signalling. Principal component analysis will be used to capture the common variation explained 
by these indicator variables. The object scores for the first principal component will then be used 
to form a continuous independent variable (SIGNAL) to proxy for signalling. A positive 
coefficient within the cross-sectional analysis is predicted for the SIGNAL proxy. 
3.3 Litigation Risk 
Current literature points out a situation in which "bad" performing firms will wish to 
disclose environmental information. Skinner (1994) hypothesizes that "bad" performing firms 
will voluntarily disclose information to reduce future litigation costs. The CICA points out the 
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risk of litigation in its' Executive Briefing Climate Change and Related Disclosures 2008 report 
where it states: 
For public companies, executives and directors (among others) need to consider 
the potential for lawsuits in Canada whereby they can be at risk for providing 
misleading public disclosures or failing to make timely disclosures. (CICA, 10) 
As has been previously stated, future regulations are highly likely. These regulations will 
adversely affect the "bad" GHG emitting firms. The increased cost of complying with the new 
regulations will lower future cash flows, which will lower share prices. Investors that are caught 
by surprise with the loss in share value may fault firms for not making material disclosures. The 
disclosing of the ''bad'' climate change information will act as a defence to this type oflawsuit. 
However, the disclosures being made are environmental disclosures. The information 
being requested could be used to link a firm to its contribution to global warming. Since the 
ecological changes that are associated with climate change will affect a broad base of the 
population, there is a risk of lawsuits that seek to compensate parties for the damages they have 
received due to global warming. In the United States, lawsuits pertaining to climate change have 
already begun. The first case involving climate change was decided on September 15, 2005. In 
this case several States sued for an injunction against the public nuisance of global warming by 
six different electric power corporations lO• On June 30, 2006 Ned Comer led a class action suit 
against several American oil, coal and electric power companies. The plaintiffs sought restitution 
for the damages caused by Hurricane Katrina alleging that the defendants' GHG emissions 
contributed to the extreme weatherll . On September 20, 2006, the State of California sued 
members of the automotive industry for their role in global warming12• On February 26,2008 the 
Village of Kivalina sued several power companies for damages caused by global warming 13. 
While none of these cases were successful, they do indicate that society is already looking for 
10 State of Connecticut, et al. v. American Electric Power Company Inc., et al. 
11 Ned Comer, et al. v. Murphy Oil USA, et al. 
12 People of the State of California v. General Motors Corporation, et al. 
13 Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corporation et al. 
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restitution for the damages caused by global warming. This litigious trend will create an incentive 
for firms to avoid disclosing environmental information. Hypothesis four is as follows: 
~: The higher a firm's exposure to litigation risk, the greater the likelihood 
that the litigation risk will influence the firm's decision to disclose 
environmental information through the CDP. 
Each firm has a different level of exposure to litigation risk. The higher a firm's litigation 
risk, the more likely it will influence a firm's decision to disclose environmental information. 
Since this litigation risk is not directly measurable, an indicator variable (LIT) will be used to 
proxy for it. A code of I will be assigned for all firms that have been listed in environmental 
litigation within the five year period prior to the CDP's request for environmental disclosures; all 
other firms are assigned a code ofO. No direction is being hypothesized for this variable. 
3.4 Low Cost Publicity 
Clarkson, Li, and Richardson (2004) identified several benefits associated with being 
considered a "green" firm. For many fmns competing in industries such as retail or information 
technology, the emissions created through processing, packaging, and transportation are higher 
than the emissions created through its own business practices. Since a firm's carbon footprint 
goes beyond its own direct emissions, some companies such as WalMart, PepsiCo and mM have 
begun to use supply-chain management, choosing suppliers with lower emissions levels 14. 
Walton, Handfield, and Melnyk (1998) provided empirical support for this concept when they 
found that firms in the pulp and paper industry with lower polluting levels than industry rivals 
were in a superior position to gain long-term contracts with "green" customers. There is also the 
concept of "green goodwill" which implies that, if consumers prefer to buy a "greener" product, 
they will be willing to pay a premium for it (Kristrom and Lundgren [2003]). Blend and 
Ravenswaay (1999) provide empirical support for consumers wanting "greener" products in terms 
14 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). 2009. <https:/ /www.cdprojectnet!en-USjProgrammesjPages/CDP-Supply-
Chain.aspx.> Retrieved September 29, 2009. 
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of apples. Their study examined the demand for eco-Iabeled apples and they found there was a 
significant demand for the "greener" product. 
For firms in low carbon intensive industries, the CDP represents an inexpensive means to 
build a "green" reputation. Low carbon intensive industries include: Financial Services; 
Hospitality, Leisure, and Business Services; Retail and Consumer; and Technology, Media, and 
Telecommunications. These industries have low greenhouse gas emissions and are therefore less 
likely to be considered responsible for the physical damages that have already occurred due to 
global warming. These firms will also have less difficulty transitioning to a carbon constrained 
economy. To elaborate on this point, Merrill Lynch & Co. had a carbon intensity15 of 6 in 2008. 
In comparison, Ameren Corporation, a firm which competes in the Utilities Industry, had a 
carbon intensity of 9,036 in 200816. While these carbon intensity values are unique to these firms, 
they do highlight a clear difference between the pollution levels that exist among companies that 
disclose through the CDP. For firms with extremely low carbon emissions, such as Merrill Lynch 
& Co, there is little fear that the information it discloses will lead the market to re-evaluate how 
susceptible it is to the risks associated with global warming. This means that low carbon intensity 
firms are unlikely to suffer a negative market reaction due to the disclosing of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Furthermore, the costs associated with collecting emissions data are considerably 
lower for low carbon intensive firms. According to the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, the leading 
body in setting greenhouse gas reporting standards, the only sources of direct emissions for 
office-based organizations come from owning vehicles, stationary combustion devices or 
refrigerators and air conditioning equipment17• High carbon intensive firms, on the other hand, 
must examine their entire business process. They must calculate direct emissions from physical or 
15 Carbon Intensity is calculated by dividing the firms disclosed carbon emissions by its disclosed annual 
revenue. The numbers are given as a means of demonstrating the extreme differences that exist between 
industries. I am not aware of any standards or benchmarks that can be used to evaluate each firm's individual 
performance. 
16 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Report. 2008. USA S&P 500. <https://www.cdproject.netfen-
US/Results/Pages/lnvestors-2008-Reports.aspx.> Retrieved September 29, 2009. 
17 Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standards (Corporate Standard). The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative. 
<http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards.> [Retrieved 29 September 2009] 
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chemical processes, as well as identify emissions caused by the wearing down of equipment. This 
is a far more involved procedure with higher costs. For a frrm that already has a low emissions 
level, only a minimal amount of effort is required to collect emissions information, and in doing 
so, the firm can claim that it is a "green" company. 
For these firms with low emissions, the CDP can be used as a means to increase its 
reputation through positive publicity. The role of pUblicity in corporate governance is an 
important issue that has thus far received little academic attention (Zingales [2000]). Wu (2004) 
examined the impact publicity had upon corporate governance through the examination of firms 
that had been publicly targeted by the California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS). The negative publicity generated by being targeted by CalPERS was found to be 
associated with corporate governance changes. Barton (2005) found that frrms with greater media 
exposure were quicker to replace Arthur Anderson LLP after its highly publicized audit failure of 
Enron. Furthermore, many of these highly public firms replaced Arthur Anderson LLP with 
another Big Five auditor. The use of Big Five auditors is generally considered as a means to 
improve a frrm's reputation for having credible fmancial reporting. The rapid switching of 
auditors after the current auditor suffers a loss in reputation suggests that visible firms are 
interested in maintaining and building reputations. Taken together, these papers demonstrate 
management's concern for publicity. The CDP represents a highly publicized global forum for the 
release of environmental information. A frrm that either knows it has low carbon intensity or that 
competes in an industry with low emission levels is able to capitalize on the publicity generated 
through the CDP without the fear of being negatively affected by the report. 
Hs: Firm's that do not produce scope 1 direct GHG emissions will be more 
likely to respond to the CDP by disclosing environmental information. 
An indicator variable (LOWGHG) was used to proxy for firms that produce low levels of 
greenhouse gases. The variable was constructed by first determining which frrms are currently 
expected to be affected by future greenhouse gas emission regulations. The Environmental 
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Protection Agencies' 2009 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases; Proposed Rule was used 
for guidance and additional fIrms were added when listed by the CDP as competing in carbon 
intensive industries. Examples of the high carbon impact sectors listed by the CDP include 
Manufacturing, Oil & Gas, Mining and Transportation. When available, a fIrm's direct emissions 
were also used to ensure fIrms were properly coded. Firms identifIed as high greenhouse gas 
producers were coded as a 0 and all others were assigned a 1. The proxy for low cost publicity is 
expected to have a positive coefficient. 
4.0 Data Collection and Method of Analysis 
4.1 Data Collection 
The sample used in this study was taken from the CDP Core database. The CDP currently 
controls the world's largest database of primary corporate climate change information. The 
database provides information concerning the fIrms' responses to its questionnaires, fIrm 
characteristics such as market capitalization and industry, as well information pertaining to the 
signatory investors' ownership stake in each fIrm. The sample has been restricted to the firms 
from the CDP's Canada 200 data sets. Canada has high levels of socially responsible investing, so 
that Canadian firms should be sensitive to the shareholder activism being displayed by the CDP. 
Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2007) estimate the Canadian socially responsible investment retail 
industry to be the second largest in the world. Furthermore, the Canadian sample includes a 
breakdown of each fIrm's percentage of signatory investor ownership; information that is not 
available in the CDP's other samples. Observations were taken for the period 2006 to 2009. 
Data for total, domestic and foreign signatory investors, as well as relative domestic 
signatory ownership, was retrieved from the CDP's annual reports. The reports released with 
information concerning Canadian fIrms include both total signatory ownership percentages and 
domestic signatory ownership percentages. The total signatory ownership (TOTSIG) and the 
domestic signatory ownership (DOMSIG) variables consisted of the information provided 
directly through these reports, while the foreign signatory ownership (FORSIG) variable was 
25 
constructed by removing the percentage of domestic signatory ownership from the total signatory 
ownership percentage provided by the CDP. The relative domestic signatory ownership 
(RelativeDOMSIG) was calculated by dividing the domestic signatory ownership by the total 
signatory ownership. 
Data for construction of the litigation risk proxy (LIT) was retrieved from LawSource18 • 
A case search was run for each firm in the sample using the option to limit the results by the 
"environmental" subject area. Each case was then reviewed to ensure that it was environmental 
litigation and the company in question was named as a defendant. An indicator variable was then 
created with a 1 representing that the firm had been listed as a defendant in an environmental 
litigation case within a five year period prior to being asked to disclose environmental 
information through the CDP. 
Two sources were used to establish which firms produced lower levels of greenhouse 
gases. Stanny (2009) used the Environmental Protection Agencies' 2009 Mandatory Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases; Proposed Rule to establish which firms would be affected by proposed future 
regulations. The document lists industries by the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes. Since the LOWGHG proxy is intending to capture firms that are not likely to be 
affected by future regulations, the same list Stanny (2009) used from the Mandatory Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases; Proposed Rule was used as a starting point to identify firms that would be 
given a O. Information from the CDP reports indicating industries that are high polluters was then 
used to ensure all high greenhouse gas producers had been identified. All firms that were not 
identified were coded as aI, indicating that they were not likely to be affected by future 
regulations. 
Four variables were added to control for firm performance and three variables were added 
for time effects. The four variables added to control for performance were SIZE, ROA, LEV, and 
TOBINQ. The natural log of a firm's total assets averaged over the prior two years of being 
18 LawSource is a database that provides information pertaining to Canadian case law. 
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approached by the CDP was used as a proxy for size (SIZE). Larger firms receive more media 
attention than smaller firms. This increase in attention increases the level of scrutiny a larger frrm 
must endure. This higher level of scrutiny will make it more difficult for a larger firm to justify 
the withholding of climate change information. The larger a firm is the more likely they will be to 
disclose information through the CDP. The return on assets (ROA) was calculated by dividing net 
income averaged over the prior two years by total assets averaged over the prior two years. A 
firm's return on assets is a measure of its profitability. A more profitable firm has an incentive to 
release climate change information to ensure investors that the higher level of profitability has not 
come at the expense of neglecting the climate change issue. As we move to a carbon constrained 
economy, firms that have not properly addressed the issue will face additional costs which will 
lower their profitability. A more profitable frrm will want to inform investors that they have a 
higher quality of earnings, which will remain intact even with higher levels of environmental 
regulation. The frrm leverage (LEV) was calculated by dividing the frrm's total debt averaged 
over the prior two years by the total assets averaged over the prior two years. Higher leveraged 
firms are more likely to have debt covenants. Firms with debt covenants will be more cautious in 
making disclosures since they will not wish to take any actions that risk breaking the existing debt 
covenant. Therefore, higher leveraged firms will be less likely to disclose through the CDP. The 
Tobin Q (TOBINQ) was calculated by the total market value averaged over the prior two years 
divided by total assets averaged over the prior two years. A Tobin Q higher than one shows that a 
firm is worth more than the value of its assets. Firms with higher Tobin Q scores tend to be 
forward looking. These firms will recognize the need to prepare for the business implications 
associated with climate change. A firm with a higher Tobin Q will be more likely to disclose 
through the CDP. The data used to construct these variables was retrieved from DataStream. The 
indicator variables used to control for time effects are CDP5, CDP6 and CDP7. These variables 
represent data from 2007,2008, and 2009 respectively, with 2006 being used as the base year. 
INSERT TABLE I 
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The original sample consisted of 858 fmn year observations. However, as shown by table 
I, 40 observations were removed from the sample due to incomplete fmancial information, 
leaving a sample consisting of 818 firm year observations for the logistic regression. Table 2 lists 
the descriptive statistics for the sample. Means, medians and standard deviations are given for the 
percentages of both domestic and foreign signatory investor ownership, total assets, market value, 
long-term debt, total liabilities, total shareholder equity and net income. Statistics are provided for 
fmns that disclosed, fmns that did not disclose, and the difference between the two samples. 
Table 3 lists the frequencies and percentages of occurrence for all of the binary variables to be 
included within the logistic regression. Statistics are provided for the entire sample as well as for 
the subsets of the sample that either disclosed or did not disclose. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
A visual inspection of the descriptive statistics listed in table 2 reveal some key 
differences between the disclosing fmns and non-disclosing fmns. Even though the firm with the 
highest level of domestic signatory investor ownership is a non-disclosing firm, it appears to be 
an anomaly since on average there is a higher level of signatory investor ownership for disclosing 
firms. This higher level of domestic signatory firm ownership for disclosing firms is consistent 
with hypothesis two which predicted that higher levels of domestic signatory firm ownership 
would be associated with higher disclosure levels. The descriptive statistics also reveal that the 
disclosing fmns have on average higher levels of total assets, long-term debt, total liabilities, and 
total shareholders equity as well as greater market values and net income. However, there is also 
a higher level of variability within the disclosing sample, so these differences should be read with 
caution. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 shows that the disclosing firms consist of a higher percentage of firms that have 
been previously exposed to environmental litigation. The sample of disclosing fmns had 19.1 % 
of the sample exposed to litigation risk while the non-disclosing firms had only 5.4% of the 
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sample exposed to litigation risk. This finding supports hypothesis four which predicted that there 
would be an association between litigation risk and disclosures. Table 3 also reveals that 58.9% of 
the non-disclosing firms produced low levels of greenhouse gases while 51.6% of the disclosing 
firms produced low levels of greenhouse gases. This does not support hypothesis five which 
predicted that firms producing low levels of greenhouse gases would be more likely to disclose to 
take advantage of low cost publicity. 
The CDP releases the surveys it receives to the signatory investors as it collects them. 
These signatory investors are large institutional investors; this means there should be evidence of 
a market response on the private dates that the information is received by them. Since the date 
this information is released is private, there existed a challenge in determining when the 
information reached the market. Each individual questionnaire was read in an effort to determine 
when this information was given to the signatory investors. Dates were taken from two sources. 
The first source was from respondents that dated the actual response, and the second was taken 
from the creation date found within the attributes of any portable document format (PDF) file 
attached to the response. All attached PDF files were examined with care to determine that they 
were created for the CDP and not formerly released documents meant to demonstrate the firm's 
commitment to climate change. When dates were determined a search on Google was used to 
make sure no other confounding financial information was released around the same time as the 
CDP survey. The final sample for the event study and cross section analysis consisted of 107 firm 
year observations. Stock return information for the tests was retrieved from DataStream. 
Table 4 lists the descriptive statistics and table 4 lists the frequencies for the sample to be 
used for the event study and cross-sectional regression. The tables follow the same formats as 
table 2 and table 3. Since all observations in the sample consist of firms that disclosed 
environmental information through the CDP, only statistics for the entire sample are given. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
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The descriptive statistics displayed in table 4 highlight some different characteristics 
between the sample of 107 disclosing firms used in the event study and the 351 disclosing fIrms 
used in the logistic regression. All variables, except the percentage of foreign signatory 
ownership, are higher in the event study sample than the logistic regression sample. This indicates 
that the event study will capture the market response to the larger, more profitable firms with 
higher signatory frrm ownership. This difference in firm characteristics is confrrmed by the 
percentages of occurrences listed in table 5. There are higher occurrence levels for both litigation 
risk and of low greenhouse gas producing frrms in the event sample study as opposed to the 
disclosing firms from the logistic regression. This is not a surprising difference between sample 
characteristics. The collection of the data for the private event study required the disclosures to 
have some form of date stamp. This inclusion of a date could be considered as a higher quality of 
disclosure which would be consistent with larger firms. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Four additional control variables were added to the cross-sectional regression to control 
for disclosure characteristics that could potentially influence the market reaction. The variable 
INITIAL is a binary variable coded as a I if the disclosure was the first time a firm had responded 
to the CDP and a 0 otherwise. Since these disclosures are the first time a firm has disclosed 
through the CDP they have the added quality of informing investors that a firm is willing to 
provide the information they are requesting. Furthermore, the CDP requests similar disclosures 
each year which creates a considerable amount of overlap within a frrm's disclosures from one 
year to the next. The fITst disclosure made through the CDP contains only information that has 
not previously been disclosed through the CDP. Due to these disclosure characteristics, a fIrm 
will receive a greater positive market response for its first disclosure. LEADER is a binary 
variable coded as a I for firms that were identified by the CDP as disclosure leaders and a 0 
otherwise. Higher disclosure levels will be better at reducing the information asymmetry gap 
between management and investors. This will create lower levels of uncertainty which will result 
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in a greater positive market response. FOLLOWED is a binary variable coded as I for disclosures 
that consisted of information that was previously disclosed through the frrm's annual report. This 
variable represents information that is not new; it represents disclosures that should already be 
reflected in share prices. This information should not influence the market reaction. 
GOODNEWS is a continuous variable created to represent how well a frrm is positioned to 
contend with the climate change issue. Each questionnaire was carefully read. Information 
disclosed pertaining to a frrm being exposed to risk related to climate change, revealing a failure 
to lower greenhouse gas emissions, or any actual emission levels would lower a firms 
GOODNEWS score by 1. While information pertaining to a firm's actions to address the climate 
change issue, successes in lowering emissions, or indicators that the firm is taking the climate 
change issue seriously such as improvements in environmental corporate governance or having 
emissions audited would increase the GOODNEWS score by 1. This process produced a variable 
that was positive for frrms that had released more information concerning how it was dealing with 
the climate change issue than information pertaining to how adversely the frrm would be affected 
by climate change and a negative value when the information content was reversed. This should 
be read with caution since evidence suggests that the information disclosed is not comparable. 
However, even with this data issue, the net effect of the positive verse negative news should have 
a positive effect on the market response to the disclosures being made. 
4.2 Logistic Regression 
The following binary logistic model was used to test hypotheses one, two, four and five: 
!(AQ) = 1+e1_AQ (1) 
Two different sets of independent variables were employed. The first model is as follows: 
AQ = Po + P1TOTSIG + P2 Re lativeDOM8G + P3L1T + P4LOWGHG 
+ PsSIZE + P6ROA + P7LEV + PgTOBINQ + P9CDP5 + PloCDP6 (2) 
+PllCDP7+8 
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The second model was as follows: 
AQ = Po + P1DOMSIG+ P2FORSIG+ P3L1T + P4LOWGHG 
+ PsSIZE + P6ROA + P7LEV + P6TOBINQ + P7CDP5 + PsCDP6 (3) 
+P9CDP7 +& 
where, 
AQ is 1 if the ftrm answered the CDP questionnaire. 
TOTSIG is the percentage of signatory ftrm ownership. 
RelativeDOMSIG is the domestic signatory fmn ownership divided by the total 
signatory ftrm ownership. 
DOMSIG is the percentage of domestic signatory ftrm ownership. 
FORSIG is the percentage of foreign signatory fmn ownership. 
LIT is 1 if a fmn has been listed in an environmental lawsuit within 
the previous 5 years. 
LOWGHG is 1 if a fmn's business process does not produce a signiftcant 
level of GHG emissions. 
SIZE is the natural log of total shareholder's equity averaged over the 
prior two years. 
ROA is the net income averaged over the prior two years divided by 
the total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
LEV is the total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the 
total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
TOBINQ is the total market value averaged over the prior two years 
divided by total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
CDP5 is 1 for observations from the 2007 sample. 
CDP6 is 1 for observations from the 2008 sample. 
CDP7 is 1 for observations from the 2009 sample. 
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Seven control variables were added to both of the binary logistic models. These include 
the size of the firm, the return on assets, leverage and the firm's Tobin Q as well as three dummy 
variables used to control for time effects. The reason for the inclusion of these variables has been 
previously discussed within the data collection section of this paper. 
4.3 Market Reaction to CDP Disclosures 
Event study methodology was used to analyze the market reaction to firms' responses to 
the CDP. The methodology was originally developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and received 
further examination by Brown and Warner (1985). The following single factor market model was 
employed: 
(4) 
where, 
R . t = The continuously compounded rate of return on security j on day t; j, 
Rm t = The rate of return on the value weighted market index on day t; 
a j = The intercept of the linear relationship for security j; 
P j = The slope of the linear relationship between security j and the return on the 
market index; and 
8 j ,t = Random variable with expected value of zero. 
An OLS regression model was used to estimate the coefficients using data from trading 
day t - 210 through trading day t - 61 relative to the announcement day of t = O. The market 
reaction to the CDP disclosures was then captured between trading day t - 1 and trading day t + 
1 and between trading day t - 5through t +5. Abnormal returns (Ajt) were calculated using 
equation (5) for the/h firm on day t. 
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(5) 
Equation (6) was used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CART1j,T2) for firmj. The 
window being tested is represented by a starting date of T1j and an ending date of T2j• 
(6) 
Due to the nature of the disclosures being requested, there is an expectation that event-
induced variance will exist within the data. Each industry has a different exposure level to the 
risks and rewards associated with climate change. Therefore, it is anticipated that investors will 
respond differently to each firm depending on its situation. For example, we would expect to 
witness a different market response for banks that disclose environmental information than oil 
and gas companies. Therefore, the standardized cross-sectional method was used to test for the 
statistical significance of the cumulative abnormal return. The standardized cross-sectional 
method standardizes residuals before forming portfolios as shown in equation (7). This will allow 
for heteroskedastic event day residuals and ensure that securities with large variances do not 
dominate the test. This test was introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) who also 
documented its empirical properties. 
(7) 
where, 
( I:Rmt -LjRm&tJ2 Lj t=Tlj L j 1 + - + ""O""""M:-:'.-------"-
M. '( -\2 ] L Rmk -Rm&t J (8) 
k=l 
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where, 
Lj is the length of the window, or event date being tested, in trading days as calculated by 
equation (9) and ~ is the number of non-missing returns in the estimation period: 
(9) 
Equation (10) was used to determine the standardized cross-sectional test statistic. 
N 
LSCA~j,T2j 
Z = ....:.i=--"I--:-___ _ 
t 1 (10) 
N2SSCA~ 
where, 
(11) 
A binomial sign test will also be used to help verify that the results are not being driven 
by a small group of fmns. Results will be compared to the fraction of positive returns in the 
estimation period. This methodology has been used by Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) and Cowan 
(1992). 
4.4 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis was used to form a proxy to represent a firm's intention to 
signal to the market its commitment to the climate change issue. Principal component analysis is 
used to explain the variance-covariance structure through linear combinations of the variables in 
question. These linear combinations can then be used to reproduce the total variability through a 
smaller number of components. The principal component can then replace the original variables 
for further testing. 
Similar to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache [2002], an aggregate index was formed 
through principal component analysis using several binary variables provided by the CDP. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache [2002] used principal component analysis to form an index to 
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represent moral hazard using eight dummy variables. The Canadian reports issued by the CDP 
include a summary table of the disclosures each ftrm made. These summary tables list speciftc 
disclosures and provide an indicator variable as to whether or not a ftrm made the disclosure. 
Only eight speciftc disclosures were consistently provided through the full four years used in this 
study. These disclosures were then used to form binary variables. The eight binary variables used 
were: whether or not the ftrm had assigned board representation for the issue of climate change, 
whether or not the ftrm had assigned a senior executive with responsibility for the issue of climate 
change, whether or not emissions data was disclosed, whether or not third party protocol was 
followed in the calculation of emissions, whether or not emission data had been externally 
verifted, whether or not the fmn has taken steps to prepare for future trading regimes, whether or 
not the ftrm had a plan to reduce its emissions, and whether or not the ftrm provided a formal plan 
with deftned goals and timelines for the reduction of greenhouse gases. Since principal 
component analysis is better suited for larger samples, the entire sample of 366 fmn year 
observations for disclosing ftrms from the original sample 858 ftrm year observations was used 
for the analysis. All variables loaded onto the ftrst component at 0.555 or higher. The cronbach 
alpha for the ftrst component was 0.871. However, it only explains 52.5% of the total variation 
which is lower than the 83% of total variation the principal component Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache [2002] used. The second component in the analysis explained 11 % of the variation 
while the second component in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache's [2002] study explained 10%. 
The remainder of the components in the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache [2002] study explained 
less than 1 % each, while the remaining components for this study explained between 10% and 
2% of the variation. While this does represent a deviation from the Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache [2002] study the signalling index formed from the analysis should still be an 
acceptable proxy for signalling. Since all eight components only loaded strongly on the fIrst 
component, the 52.5% of total variation explained represents the common aspect between the 
eight variables used. It is the representation of a dedication to the climate change issue that each 
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of these eight variables has in common and it is this dedication that the principal component 
analysis is trying to capture. Therefore, the object scores should work as an effective proxy for 
signalling. 
4.5 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
A cross-sectional analysis was used to find support for hypothesis three. The following 
two OLS regression model were employed: 
CAAR = Po + PI SIGNAL + P2INITIAL + P3LEADER + P4FOLLOWED 
+ PsGOODNEWS + P6TOTSIG + P7 Re lativeDOM8G + PsLIT 
+ P9LOWGHG + PlOSIZE+ PllROA+ P12LEV + P13TOBINQ+ P14CDP5 
+ PIsCDP6 + P16CDP7 + I] 
(12) 
The second model was as follows: 
where, 
CAAR= Po + PI SIGNAL + P2INITIAL+ P3LEADER+ P4FOLLOWED 
+ PsGOODNEWS + P6DOMSIG+ P7FORSIG+ PsLIT (l3) 
+ P9LOWGHG + PlOSIZE + PllROA + P12LEV + P13TOBINQ 
+ P14CDP5 + P15CDP6 + P16CDP7 + I] 
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return from the event study. 
Both an eleven day window and three day window are used. 
SIGNAL is the object scores from the principal component analysis. 
INITIAL is 1 if the disclosure is the first disclosure a firm has made 
through the CDP. 
LEADER is 1 for firms that were identified as disclosure leaders by the 
CDP. 
FOLLOWED is 1 for disclosures that were previously made through a fIrmS 
annual report. 
GOODNEWS is a continuous variable that was constructed by adding a 1 for 
all disclosures that would be considered "good" news and 
TOTSIG 
RelativeDOMSIG 
DOMSIG 
FORSIG 
LIT 
LOWGHG 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
TOBINQ 
CDP5 
CDP6 
CDP7 
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subtracting a 1 for all disclosures that would be considered "bad" 
news. 
is the percentage of signatory fum ownership. 
is the domestic signatory frrm ownership divided by the total 
signatory frrm ownership. 
is the percentage of domestic signatory firm ownership. 
is the percentage of foreign signatory firm ownership. 
is 1 if a firm has been listed in an environmental lawsuit within 
the previous 5 years. 
is I if a firm's business process does not produce a significant 
level of GHG emissions. 
is the natural log of total shareholder's equity averaged over the 
prior two years. 
is the net income averaged over the prior two years divided by 
the total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
is the total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the 
total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
is the total market value averaged over the prior two years 
divided by total assets averaged over the prior two years. 
is 1 for observations from the 2007 sample. 
is 1 for observations from the 2008 sample. 
is 1 for observations from the 2009 sample. 
The CAAR from the event study is used as the dependant variable. Each model was run 
twice, the first time included the three day window CAAR as the dependant variable, while the 
second time used the eleven day CAAR as the dependant variable. Four control variables were 
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added to account for disclosure characteristics. These variables and the reasons for there inclusion 
is discussed in the data collection section of this paper. Variables from the logistic regression 
were also added to control for the influencing factors for the disclosures being made. 
s.o Empirical Results 
S.l Logistic Regression 
Table 6 displays the correlations between the variables included within both of the 
logistic regression models. As would be expected, TOTSIG is highly correlated with DOMSIG 
and FORSIG. This is most likely due to TOTSIG being the sum of DOMSIG and FORSIG. 
TOTSIG is not used in the same model as DOMSIG and FORSIG, so the high correlation will not 
cause any problems within the analysis. RelativeDOMSIG is also highly correlated with both 
DOMSIG and FORSIG. Much like TOTSIG, it was calculated using DOMSIG and FORSIG, so 
the correlation is not surprising. Since RelativeDOMSIG is not used in models with DOMSIG 
and FORSIG, it will not create any multicollinearity issues. There is a statistically significant 
correlation of 0.635 between SIZE and LEV. Collinearity diagnostic was run to ensure no 
multicollinearity existed. All variables had a tolerance greater than 0.5 and the highest variance 
inflation factor was 2.05. Therefore, since all tolerance values were greater than 0.2 and all VIF 
values were less than 5, multicollinearity should not be an issue. There are also statistically 
significant correlations between AQ and CDP6 as well as CDP7, giving support for the inclusion 
of control variables for the time effects. The correlations also show that LIT is negatively 
correlated to LOWGHG at a highly significant level. This result is not surprising since lower 
greenhouse producing firms should be less likely to be involved in environmental litigation. LIT 
is also positively correlated with SIZE at a statistically significant level. This suggests that larger 
firms are more likely to get sued. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
The results from the binary logistic regression are displayed in Table 7. Nagelkerke's 
Pseudo-R Square and the model Likelihood Ratio were used to test the models goodness of fit. 
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The first model's Likelihood Ratio was significant with a p-value<O.OOO. The Nagelkerke R 
Square was 0.259 representing an adequate fit. The second model has some minor improvements 
in fit with a Likelihood Ratio that is significant at a p-value<O.OOO and a Pseudo R Square of 
0.262. 
The coefficient for the percentage of total signatory investors had a positive direction; 
however, it failed to have any statistical significance. This finding fails to support the first 
hypothesis that predicts management disclosing information as a response to shareholder 
activism. The relative level of domestic signatory investors also lacks any significant influence on 
management's decision to disclose environmental information through the CDP. However, the 
domestic signatory firm ownership in the second model was positive and statistically significant 
at a p-value of less than 0.05. Taken together, it appears that groups of domestic institutional 
investors are capable of influencing a firm's response to shareholder activism. However, foreign 
institutional investors do not seem to share the same benefit. 
The estimated coefficient for the litigation risk variable is significant at a p<O.OI level in 
both models. The sign of the coefficient was not hypothesized. The results indicate a negative 
influence. Therefore, there is support for litigation risk influencing the decision to disclose, and 
fmdings suggest that firms do not believe that premature disclosures will be beneficial in the 
defence of environmental litigation. Rather, it appears that firms concerned with potential 
lawsuits are choosing not to disclose information. 
INSERT TABLE 7 
The results give support for the fifth hypothesis that predicts that firms with low 
emissions levels are disclosing for low cost publicity. The estimated coefficient for the variable 
representing low greenhouse gas emitting fmns was both positive and significant at the p<0.05 
level in both models. This indicates that firms with low cost of compliance are more likely to 
disclose than those firms that need to be concerned with future regulations. 
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5.2 Market Reaction to the CDP Disclosures 
Table 8 displays the results from the market reaction to the release of the CDP 
questionnaires to the signatory investors. With the exception of day t -3, there are no statistically 
significant average abnormal returns (AAR) within either of the event windows. Neither the 
CAAR from the three day window from day t - 1 to day t + 1 nor the CAAR from the 11 day 
window from day t - 5 to day t +5 are statistically significant. This lack of significant results 
could be related to individual disclosure characteristics that differ across the sample. Therefore, 
further univariate tests of the market reaction were conducted. The CAAR for both the t -1 to t + 1 
and t - 5 to t +5 windows will still be used within the cross-sectional regression. However, results 
from the regression analysis will need to be read with caution since they are based on results that 
are not statistically significant. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
5.3 Univariate Tests of Market Reaction 
Three subsamples from the 107 observations used in the event study were tested to 
determine if the market reaction to the disclosures being made was dependant upon disclosure 
characteristics. The three binary variables included in the cross-sectional regression models to 
control for disclosure characteristics were used to split the sample. The first subsample used in an 
event study included all firms that were coded with a 1 for the INITIAL variable. This event 
study tests the market reaction to the first time a firm disclosed climate change related 
information through the CDP. The sample consisted of 38 fIrm year observations. Results are 
displayed in table 9. Consistent with the fmdings from the original event study, there was not a 
significant market response. 
INSERT TABLE 9 
The second subsample used consists of all fIrmS that had been identified as disclosure 
leaders by the CDP. The sample consisted of 26 firm year observations. Results are displayed in 
table 10. As with the original event study, there was not a statistically significant market reaction. 
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INSERT TABLE 10 
The final event study included all firms that were coded as a 0 for the FOLLOWED 
variable. By performing this event study, the market response is analysed for firms that released 
new information. The sample consisted of 45 ·firm year observations. As with the original event 
study, there was not a statistically significant market response. 
INSERT TABLE 11 
The lack of a statistically significant market response is consistent with the fmdings of 
Kolk et al. (2008). Kolk et al. (2008) concluded that the information being provided through the 
CDP was not useful to investors. The lack of a statistically significant market response supports 
their findings. 
5.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 12 is the correlation matrix for the variables included within the cross-sectional 
analysis ofthe market response to the information released through the CDP. 
INSERT TABLE 12 
As would be expected, the three day CAAR is highly correlated to the eleven day CAAR. 
The SIGNAL variable is correlated to all four of the disclosure characteristic control variables at 
a statistically significant level. This result is not surprising since the SIGNAL variable was 
constructed by using disclosure information. There are no significant correlations between the 
dependant variables from either model and the control variables for either firm or the time effects. 
Similar to the correlations from the logistic regression, TOTSIG and RelativeDOMSIG are highly 
correlated to both DOMSIG and FORSIG. As with the logistic regression analysis, these 
variables are run in separate models. The only other highly correlated variables were SIZE and 
LEV. As with the logistic regression, collinearity diagnostic was ran. The lowest tolerance was 
0.343 which is greater than 0.2. The highest variance inflation factor was 2.912 which is less than 
5. Therefore, multicollinearity should not be an issue. There are statistically significant 
correlations between the variable constructed to represent signalling (SIGNAL) and litigation risk 
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(LIT), low greenhouse gas emitting firms (LOWGHG) as well as SIZE and LEV. These 
relationships seem intuitive; firms that have been subjected to environmental litigation in 
previous years would be interested in signalling to the market that they are no longer poor 
environmental performers. Those firms with low emission levels would have less to lose by 
signalling the market, and large firms are more visible and are more likely to benefit from being 
promoted as a "green" firm. 
INSERT TABLE 13 
Table 13 displays the results from the cross-sectional analysis. Neither ofthe models ran 
with the three days window had statistically significant results for the SIGNAL variable. The two 
models ran with the eleven days window failed to have statistically significant results for the 
SIGNAL variable as well. Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared for the models run with the three 
days window as the dependant variable were extremely low showing the models to be poor fits. 
The adjusted R -squared values for the models with the eleven days window CAAR used as the 
dependant variables were larger than the adjusted R-squared values from the three days window 
CAAR models; the model ran with TOTSIG and RelativeDOMSIG had an adjusted R-squared of 
0.164 and the model ran with DOMSIG and FORSIG had an adjusted R-squared value of 0.137. 
Furthermore, the only statistically significant results were found in the models ran with the 
CAAR (-5, +5) as the dependant variable. In both of these models, GOODNEWS was found to be 
statistically significant; however, in each case it has a negative value. This negative coefficient 
raises an issue pertaining to how effective these climate change disclosures can be as a quasi-
regulation for pollution control. The negative fmding suggests that investors are punishing firms 
that are making early preparations to contend with the climate change issue rather than rewarding 
them. This response would create the opposite effect in terms of pollution control, instead of 
encouraging companies to improve environmental performance it would promote waiting until 
greenhouse gas reduction was necessary before investing in greenhouse gas reduction technology. 
RelativeDOMSIG was significant in model three at a p-value of less than 0.05 and the level of 
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foreign signatory investor ownership in model 4 was statistically significant at less than 5 percent. 
However, these results should be taken lightly since they are only found in the CAAR (-5, +5) 
models and are based on a market response that was not found to be statistically significant. 
Therefore, I am unable to find support for hypothesis three that management is signalling the 
market. This also raises questions pertaining to the effectiveness of using the CDP as low cost 
pUblicity. 
6.0 Conclusions 
Five hypotheses were presented to help understand management's decision to disclose 
information pertaining to climate change through the CDP. The first set of these hypotheses 
considers the CDP and its signatory investors as a new corporate governance mechanism. The 
results indicate that a firm's decision making process can be influenced by domestic institutional 
investors. However, this ability to influence a firm through a combined effort is only significant 
for domestic investors. The lack of support for hypothesis one, that greater levels of signatory 
investors would be associated with higher disclosure levels, highlights a limitation in the new 
corporate governance mechanism that has been created by the CDP and its signatory investors. 
This finding will be useful to parties interested in duplicating the CDP's efforts. While the 
evidence provided suggests that the success of shareholder activism for social issues can be 
improved, it will require support from investors in each market if a globally unified response is 
desired. 
The third hypothesis looked at the disclosures as a means for a firm to signal to the 
market that they are good environmental performers and that they can operate with greater 
regulations. The market reactions to the disclosures being made through the CDP were inspected 
to find support for this hypothesis. However, there was a lack of a statistically significant 
response to the disclosures being made. Therefore, no support was found for hypothesis three. 
Further analysis also gave indication that firms releasing "good" news were receiving a negative 
market response. This raises concerns about how effective the CDP can be at performing as a 
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quasi-regulation. With investors punishing firms that are preparing for the climate change issue 
with higher costs of capital, this mechanism will have the opposite effect, encouraging firms to 
continue with the greenhouse gas emissions. This finding was exclusive to the models containing 
the eleven days window CAAR as the dependant variables and the cross-sectional regression 
analysis was based upon an event date that was not found to be statistically significant. Therefore, 
it should be read with caution; however, it gives clear indication that the area should receive more 
attention in future studies. 
The fourth hypothesis considers the effects of environmental litigation on a firm's 
decision to disclose environmental information. Support was found for environmental litigation 
risk influencing a management's decision to disclose climate change information through the 
CDP. The direction of the coefficient was negative suggesting that the threat of shareholder 
litigation is not motivating firms to disclose climate change information. Rather, firms are 
choosing not to disclose information related to climate change when they are exposed to higher 
levels of environmental litigation risk. 
The final hypothesis considered whether the disclosures made through the CDP are low 
cost publicity. There is support for low polluting firms being more likely to disclose 
environmental information through the CDP. This indicates that the CDP is being used as an 
avenue to gain low cost publicity. However, the lack of a statistically significant market response 
implies that even though firms are attempting to use it for low cost publicity, they are not being 
rewarded with a lower cost of capital. 
When considering all of these results collectively, we can start to form a picture of the 
CDP, its signatory investors and the effectiveness of the international corporate governance 
mechanism they form. The frrst two hypotheses are reflective of the tactics that the CDP has 
chosen to follow. Since the CDP has gathered the signatory investors together to apply pressure 
on firms to disclose climate change information, we can view these hypotheses as being directly 
related to the success it has enjoyed. However, even though the CDP is an international corporate 
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governance mechanism, evidence supports its requirement of local institutional investors in order 
to be successful. Furthermore, this new form of shareholder activism appears to be more 
successful at altering the behaviour of those firms that are not likely to endure any negative 
effects if stricture regulations are passed. This is not to say that the positive results are limited to 
these firms, but rather suggests that further investigation is required before this mechanism can be 
considered as a viable substitute for mandatory reporting. This suggestion is reiterated by the 
results from both the signalling hypothesis and the litigation risk hypothesis. The lack of a 
statistically significant market response implies that investors do not value the information being 
disclosed, while the negative estimated coefficient from the litigation risk proxy supports the 
concept that those fIrmS that should be disclosing are not voluntarily disclosing through the CDP. 
Table 1: Initial Sample and Reasons for Deletion 
The following table displays the original sample size, the reasons for the removal of observations, the number of observations 
removed, the final sample sizes for the logistic regression analysis, and the final sample size for the event study and cross-sectional 
regression analysis. 
Initial Sample 
Observations removed due to lack of financial information 
Final Sample for Logistic Regression 
Observations removed due to unknown event date 
Final Sample for Event Study and Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Disclosing Firms 
366 
15 
351 
244 
107 
Non-Disclosing Firms 
492 
25 
467 
Total 
858 
40 
818 
~ 
~ 
;" 
~ 
.j::.. 
0'1 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample 
The following table displays descriptive statistics for both frrms that disclosed climate change information through the CDP and frrms that did not 
disclose information through the CDP. The mean, median and standard deviation are given for the percentage of domestic signatory ownership, the 
percentage of foreign signatory ownership, the frrms total assets, market value, long-term debt, total liabilities, total shareholders equity and net 
income. Differences between the disclosing frrIDS and non-disclosing frrms are also given. 
Disclosing Firms N=351 Non-Disclosing Firms N=467 Difference 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Mean Median Standard Deviation Mean Median 
Domestic Signatory Investors 7.92 6.64 6.39 6.06 4.31 6.40 1.87 2.33 
Foreign Signatory Investors 4.86 2.38 5.82 5.40 2.36 6.63 -0.54 0.02 
Total Assets 36813.09 4652.20 100150.81 6205.58 1710.79 18936.88 30607.51 2941.41 
Market Value 10391.64 3451.07 13448.02 3249.10 1728.00 5286.36 7142.53 1723.07 
Long-Term Debt 2326.09 851.94 3263.19 958.43 342.91 2065.66 1367.66 509.03 
Total Liabilities 32215.09 2418.52 95521.83 4512.24 854.07 16173.38 27702.85 1564.46 
Total Stockholders Equity 4380.99 1828.05 5615.78 1379.95 751.74 2058.04 3001.04 1076.31 
Net Income 651.28 228.90 1091.75 181.16 79.36 428.44 470.12 149.54 
:!3 
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Table 3: Frequencies, Full Sample 
The following table displays the frequencies and percentages of all binaIY variables included within the logistic regression analysis. Each 
variable lists the possible responses as well as the meaning of each response. Statistics are listed for the full sample as well as breakdowns 
for the subset of the sample that answered the questionnaire as well the subset of the sample that did not answer the CDP's questionnaire. 
Variable and Response 
Complete Sample N=818 
AQ 
1. Disclosed climate change information 
o. Did not disclose climate change information 
LIT 
1. Listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
O. Not listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
LOWGHG 
1. Firm's business process produces low levels of greenhouse gases 
o. Firm's business process produces high levels of greenhouse gases 
CDP5 
1. Ob servati on taken from 2007 
o. Observation not taken from 2007 
CDP6 
1. Observation taken from 2008 
o. Observation not taken from 2008 
CDP7 
1. Observation taken from 2009 
o. Observation not taken from 2009 
Disclosing Firms N=351 
LIT 
1. Listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
O. Not listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
LOWGHG 
1. Firm's business process produces low levels of greenhouse gases 
o. Firm's business process produces high levels of greenhouse gases 
CDP5 
1. Observation taken from 2007 
o. Observation not taken from 2007 
CDP6 
1. Observation taken from 2008 
o. Observation not taken from 2008 
CDP7 
1. Observation taken from 2009 
O. Observation not taken from 2009 
Non-Disclosing Firms N=467 
LIT 
1. Listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
O. Not listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
LOWGHG 
1. Firm's business process produces low levels of greenhouse gases 
O. Firm's business process produces high levels of greenhouse gases 
CDP5 
1. Observation taken from 2007 
o. Observation not taken from 2007 
CDP6 
1. Observation taken from 2008 
o. Observation not taken from 2008 
CDP7 
1. Observation taken from 2009 
o. Observation not taken from 2009 
Frequency Percentage 
351 42.9 
467 57.1 
92 11.2 
726 88.8 
456 44.3 
362 55.7 
183 22.4 
635 77.6 
177 21.6 
641 78.4 
193 23.6 
625 76.4 
67 19.1 
284 80.9 
181 51.6 
170 48.4 
83 23.6 
268 76.4 
98 27.9 
253 72.1 
97 27.6 
254 72.4 
25 5.4 
442 94.6 
275 58.9 
192 41.1 
100 21.4 
367 78.6 
79 16.9 
388 83.1 
96 20.6 
371 79.4 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Private Event Study Sample 
The following table displays descriptive statistics for the sample used in the private date 
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Domestic Signatory Investors 107 9.24 8.16 7.14 
Foreign Signatory Investors 
Total Assets 
lMarket Value 
Long-Term Debt 
Total Liabilities 
Total Stockholders Equity 
Net Income 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
4.18 
65871.37 
15389.45 
3413.81 
59153.25 
6344.19 
1057.98 
2.09 4.59 
11559.25 141982.00 
8350.32 16472.65 
2514.40 3437.30 
5550.23 136149.00 
3680.25 6774.32 
461.53 1353.71 
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Table 5: Frequencies, lTivate Date Event Study 
The following table displays the frequencies and percentages of all binary variables included within the cross-sectional regression analysis. 
Each variable lists the possible responses as well as the meaning of each response. 
Variable and Response 
LIT 
1. Listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
O. Not listed as a defendant in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP 
LOWGHG 
1. Firm's business process produces low levels of greenhouse gases 
o. Firm's business process produces high levels of greenhouse gases 
CDP5 
1. Observation taken from 2007 
o. Observation not taken from 2007 
CDP6 
1. Observation taken from 2008 
o. Observation not taken from 2008 
CDP7 
1. Observation taken from 2009 
o. Observation not taken from 2009 
Frequency Percentage 
29 27.1 
78 72.9 
62 57.9 
45 42.1 
38 35.5 
69 64.5 
19 17.8 
88 82.2 
23 21.5 
84 78.5 
Table 6: Correlation Matrix, Full Sample 
This table lists the correlations between all variables used in both of the logistic regression models. AQ is the dependant variable, it is a dummy variable coded as a I for firms that disclosed 
through the CDP and 0 otherwise. TOTSIG is the percentage of signatory finn ownership. RelativeSIG is the firms' domestic signatory ownership divided by the firms' total signatory 
ownership.DOMSIG is the percentage of domestic signatory ownerhip. FORSIG is the percentage of foreign signatory finn ownership. LIT is a dummy variable representing litigation risk, it is 
coded 1 for all firms that were listed as defendants in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP. LOWGHG is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms that produce 
low levels of greenhouse gases and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural log of the total assets averaged over the prior two years. ROA is the firms' net income averaged over the prior two years divided 
by total assets averaged over the prior two years. LEV is the firms' total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the total assets averaged over the prior two years. TOBINQ is the firms' 
market value of equity averaged over the prior two years divided by the firms book value of equity averaged over the prior two years. CDP5, CDP6, and CDP 7 are dummy variable included to 
capture time effects, they represent 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. 
AQ TOTSIG RelativeDOMSIG DOMSIG FORSIG LIT LOWGHG SIZE ROA LEV TOBINQ CDP5 CDP6 CDP7 
AQ 
TOTSIG 0.076* 
RelativeDOMSIG 0.089* -0.212** 
DOMSIG 0.143** 0.693** 0.432** 
FORSIG -0.042 0.673** -0.727** -0.068 
LIT 0.215** 0.032 0.061 0.065 -0.022 
LOWGHG -0.073* 0.063 0.114** 0.135** -0.051 -0.236** 
SIZE 0.374** 0.166** 0.212** 0.268** -0.044 0.165** 0.183** 
ROA 0 -0.042 0.137** 0.011 -0.069* 0.038 -0.079* -0.075* 
LEV 0.144** 0.084* 0.220** 0.211 ** -0.100** 0 0.333** 0.635** -0.127** 
TOBINQ -0.033 -0.04 -0.034 -0.053 -0.001 -0.05 -0.035 -0.128** 0.107** 0.044 
CDP5 0.027 -0.106** 0.461** 0.192** -0.344** 0.004 -0.036 0.042 0.06 0.036 0.007 
CDP6 0.132** -0.312** 0.072* -0.204** -0.223** 0.038 0.002 0.126** 0.026 0.031 0.061 -0.282** 
CDP7 0.083* 0.340** -0.212** 0.149** 0.317** 0.003 0.002 0.115** -0~090** 0.026 -0.051 -0.298** -0.292** 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.0 11evel (2-tailed). 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression 
Tbis table lists the results from two logistic regressions where the dependant variable for both is a dummy variable coded as a 1 for firms that disclosed through 
the CDP and 0 otherwise. Predicted sign, the coefficient estimate, standard error and wald statistic are given for the intercept as well as all independent 
variables. The first model includes TOTSIG wbich is the percentage of signatory firm ownersbip. Re1ativeSIG is the firms' domestic signatory ownersbip 
divided by the firms' total signatory ownersbip. LIT is a dummy variable representing litigation risk, it is coded 1 for all firms that were listed as defendants in 
environmenta11itigation witbin 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP. LOWGHG is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms that produce low levels of 
greenhouse gases and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natura110g of the total assets averaged over the prior two years. ROA is the firms' net income averaged over the 
prior two years divided by total assets averaged over the prior two years. LEV is the [lIrns' total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the total 
assets averaged over the prior two years. TOBINQ is the firms' market value of equity averaged over the prior two years divided by the firms book value of 
equity averaged over the prior two years. CDP5, CDP6, and CDP 7 are dummy variable included to capture time effects; they represent 2007, 2008, and 2009 
respectively. The second model replaces TOTSIG and Re1ativeDOMSIG with DOMSIG and FORSIG. DOMSIG is the percentage of domestic signatory 
ownersbip. FORSI G is the percentage of foreign signatory firm ownersbip. 819 firm year observations were used for both models. Model One had a likelihood 
ratio of 168.641 with 11 degrees of freedom and was significant at alllevels and a pseudo R-squared of 0.258. Model Two had a likelihood ratio of 177.804 
with 11 degrees offreedom and was significant at all levels and a pseudo R-squared of 0.262. 
Model One Model Two 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate Standard Error Wald Statistic Estimate Standard Error Wald Statistic 
Intercept -2.556*** 0.839 9.287 -2.764*** 0.811 11.625 
TOTSIG + 0.012 0.01 1.428 
RelativeDOMSIG + -0.085 0.286 0.089 
DOMSIG + 0.026** 0.013 3.919 
FORSIG + -0.005 0.015 0.11 
LIT +/- -0.916*** 0.272 11.335 -0.88*** 0.273 10.414 
LOWGHG + 0.409** 0.174 5.527 0.45** 0.175 6.618 
SIZE + 0.597*** 0.077 60.382 0.594*** 0.077 59.747 
ROA + 0.208 0.903 0.053 0.074 0.894 0.007 
LEV -0.959* 0.525 3.329 -l.054** 0.527 4.002 
TOBINQ + 0.01 0.019 0.27 0.011 0.019 0.36 
CDP5 +/- -0.571 ** 0.248 5.301 -0.402* 0.24 2.806 
CDP6 +/- -0.892*** 0.239 13.953 -0.836*** 0.238 12.347 
CDP7 +/- -0.573** 0.224 6.525 -0.574** 0.225 6.525 
N 819 819 
Psuedo R-Squared 0.259 0.262 
Model L.R. (d.f., p-value) 175.l70 (11, 0.000) 177.804 (11, 0.000) 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively til 
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Table 8: Market Reaction to Disclosures Made Through the CDP: Private Date 
Day is the day relative to the announcement day. AAR is the average abnormal return from the single factor market model. CAAR 
is the cumulative average abnormal return. StdCsect Z is a standardized cross-sectional z test. Rank Test is a non parametric test 
statistic to test for a significant difference in the ratios of positive, relative to negative, abnormal returns. Positive:Negative is a 
nonparametric test comparing the fraction of positive signs to the fraction of positive signs in the estimation period. 
Day AAR CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-60 -0.12 -0.12 -1.277 -0.622 50:57 
-40 0.3 0.89 0.718 0.543 53:54 
-20 -0.12 1.14 -2.105** -1.760* 48:59 
-10 -0.03 1.96 -0.547 -0.02 49:58 
-5 0.11 2.25 0.177 0.405 58:49 
-4 0.07 2.32 0.587 1.081 55:52 
-3 -0.42 1.9 -2.628*** -2.697*** 38:69« 
-2 0.22 2.11 1.128 1.296 57:50 
-1 -0.01 2.1 0.043 -0.108 51:56 
0 -0.04 2.07 0.045 -0.574 43:64( 
1 -0.16 1.91 -1.099 -0.83 48:59 
2 -0.11 1.79 -1.188 -0.227 49:58 
3 -0.03 1.77 -0.136 0.445 52:55 
4 0.08 1.85 0.035 0.326 53:54 
5 0.07 1.92 0.129 0.527 55:52 
10 -0.06 2.36 -0.622 0.146 54:53 
20 0.2 2.11 1.124 1.317 59:48 
40 0.01 2.49 -0.672 -0.261 52:55 
60 -0.01 2.33 0.237 1.072 59:48 
Window CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-1, 1 -0.21 -0.61 -0.873 42:65( 
-5,5 -0.22 -0.793 -0.107 53:54 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
< <, <, and ( indicate direction and significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
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Table 9: Market Reaction to Disclosures Made Through the CDP: Firm's First Response to CDP 
Day is the day relative to the announcement day. AAR is the average abnormal return from the single factor market model. CAAR 
is the cumulative average abnormal return. StdCsect Z is a standardized cross-sectional z test. Rank Test is a nonparametric test 
statistic to test for a significant difference in the ratios of positive, relative to negative, abnormal returns. Positive:Negative is a 
nonparametric test comparing the fraction of positive signs to the fraction of positive signs in the estimation period. 
Day AAR CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-60 -0.15 -0.15 -0.3 -0.144 20:18 
-40 -0.44 -0.32 -1.178 -1.599 12:26< 
-20 -0.13 -1.03 -0.753 -0.635 18:20 
-10 -0.11 -1.48 -0.813 -0.306 17:21 
-5 0 -1.12 -0.333 -0.586 19:19 
-4 0.06 -1.07 0.522 1.127 22:16 
-3 -0.3 -1.37 -0.7 -1.341 15:23 
-2 0.21 -1.16 0.826 0.669 21:17 
-1 0.02 -1.14 0.322 0.116 17:21 
0 0.19 -0.95 0.813 0.354 16:22 
0.03 -0.92 -0.031 0.005 17:21 
2 -0.04 -0.95 -0.205 0.34 18:20 
3 -0.07 -1.03 -0.121 -0.157 15:23 
4 0.11 -0.92 0.283 0.809 19:19 
5 -0.17 -1.09 -0,45 -0.275 18:20 
10 0.03 -1.13 -0.011 0.078 20:18 
20 0.13 -1.77 0.303 0.116 18:20 
40 0.21 -1.08 0.776 0.922 21:17 
60 0.51 -0.61 2.210* 2.710** 27:11» 
Window CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-1, 1 0.24 0.595 0.274 15:23 
-5,5 0.04 0.305 0.32 22:16 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
«, <, and (indicate direction and significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
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Table 10: Market Reaction to Disclosures Made Through the CDP: CDP Disclosure Leaders 
Day is the day relative to the announcement day. AAR is the average abnormal return from the single factor market model. CAAR 
is the cumulative average abnormal return. StdCsect Z is a standardized cross-sectional z test. Rank Test is a non parametric test 
statistic to test for a significant difference in the ratios of positive, relative to negative, abnormal returns. Positive:Negative is a 
nonpararnetric test comparing the fraction of positive signs to the fraction of positive signs in the estimation period. 
Day AAR CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-60 -0.2 -0.2 -0.957 -0.597 11:15 
-40 0.37 1.74 0.976 0.584 14:12 
-20 0.28 2.5 -0.768 -0.398 12:14 
-10 -0.13 2.69 -0.584 -0.697 9:17 
-5 -0.14 1.94 -0.195 -0.1 16:10 
-4 -0.02 1.92 -0.24 0.064 12:14 
-3 0 1.92 0.352 0.507 15:11 
-2 0.29 2.2 0.24 0.631 13:13 
-1 0.03 2.23 0.008 -0.366 12:14 
0 -0.13 2.1 -1.231 -0.94 11:15 
0.16 2.27 0.538 0.901 17:9 
2 -0.36 1.91 -0.97 -1.003 9:17 
3 0.29 2.2 0.237 0.808 14:12 
4 -0.01 2.19 -0.324 -0.282 13:13 
5 -0.07 2.12 -0.358 -0.016 13:13 
10 0.24 2.02 0.734 0.864 15:11 
20 0.29 1.01 0.414 0.549 14:12 
40 -0.31 3.35 -1.503 -1.112 11:15 
60 0.12 6.23 0.453 0.507 15:11 
Window CAAR StdCsedZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-1, 1 0.06 -0.151 -0.233 12:14 
-5,5 0.04 -0.364 0.062 12:14 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
< <, <, and ( indicate direction and significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
56 
Table 11: Market Reaetion to Disclosures Made Through the CDP: New Information Disclosed 
Day is the day relative to the announcement day. AAR is the average abnormal return from the single factor market model. CAAR 
is the cumulative average abnormal return. StdCsect Z is a standardized cross-sectional z test. Rank Test is a nonparametric test 
statistic to test for a significant difference in the ratios of positive, relative to negative, abnormal returns. Positive:Negative is a 
nonparametric test comparing the fraction of positive signs to the fraction of positive signs in the estimation period. 
Day AAR CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-60 -0.15 -0.15 -0.169 0.177 23:22 
-40 0.37 -2.82 0.853 0.502 21:24 
-20 -0.18 -5.63 -1.076 -1.03 20:25 
-10 0.07 -5.76 0.02 0.688 22:23 
-5 0.22 -5.49 0.408 0.133 21:24 
-4 -0.11 -5.6 -0.311 0.005 19:26 
-3 -0.46 -6.06 -1.912$ -2.131 * 14:31< 
-2 -0.06 -6.12 -0.169 -0.129 22:23 
-1 0.15 -5.96 0.815 0.954 22:23 
0 -0.07 -6.03 -0.614 -1.024 14:31< 
-0.31 -6.34 -0.951 -0.956 18:27 
2 -0.14 -6.48 -1.293 -0.41 20:25 
3 -0.13 -6.61 0.02 0.586 22:23 
4 0.15 -6.46 0.52 0.871 25:20 
5 0.38 -6.08 0.692 1.201 26:19 
10 -0.33 -6.19 -1.087 -0.611 20:25 
20 0.41 -5.84 1.964* 1.939$ 25:20 
40 0.11 -6.92 0.138 0.378 23:22 
60 0.12 -8.99 -1.398 -0.574 21:24 
Window CAAR StdCsectZ Rank Test Positive:Negative 
-1, 1 -0.22 -0.571 -0.593 16:29( 
-5,5 -0.37 -0.648 -0.272 24:21 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
«, <, and (indicate direction and significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
Table 12: Correlation Malrix: Cross.seetional Analysis 
This lablelists the correlations between all variables used in the cross-sectional analysis of the market response to the disclosures made through tbe CDP. CAAR (-1,+1) is the dependant variable from model I and model 3. CAAR (-5,+5) is the dependent variables for model 2 and model 4. 
They are the curnnlative average abnormal return for the three day window and eleven day window. SIGNAL is an aggregate index representing a firm's commi1men! to the climate cbange issue, it wascreated through a principal component analysis. INITIAL is a binary variable coded I if 
a disclosnre was the firm's first response to the CDP. LEADER is a binary variable coded I if the firm was identified by the CDP as a disclosnre leader. FOLLOWER is a binary variable coded I if the information disclosed through the CDP was previonsly disclosed within the firm's anonaI 
report. GOODNEWS is a contiouons variable that rates how well a firm's disclosnres show them to be positioned to conteod with the climate cbenge issne. TOTSIG is the totsl signatory investor ownership. RelativeSIG is the domestic signatory ownership divided by the total signatory 
ownership. DOMSIG is the percentage of domestic signatory ownerhip. FORSIG is the percentage of foreign signatory firm ownership. LIT is a dummy variable representing litigation risk, it is coded I for all firms that were listed as defendants in environmental litigation within 5 years 
prior to being approached by the CDP. LOWGHG is a dummy variable coded I for firms that produce low levels of greenhonse gases and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natorallog of the total assets averaged over the prior two years. ROA is the net income averaged over th eprior two years 
divided by the lotal assets averaged over the prior two years. LEV is the total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the totsl assets averaged over the prior two years. TOBINQ is the firms market valne of equity averaged over the prior two years divided by the book valne of 
equity averaged over the prior two years. CDPS, CDP6, and CDP 7 are dwmny variable included to capture time effects, they represent 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. 
CAAR(-I,+1) CAAR(-S,+S) SIGNAL INITIAL LEADER FOLLOWER GOODNEWS TOTSIG RelativeDOMSIG DOMSIG FORSIG LIT LOWGHG SIZE ROA LEV TOBINQ CDPS CDP6 CDP7 
CAAR(-I,+I) I 
CAAR (-5,+5) 0.554" 
SIGNAL O.oJ -0.054 
INITIAL 0.121 0.032 -0.279" 
LEADER 0.059 0.029 0.415" -0.329" 
FOLLOWER 0.028 0.018 0.297" -0.188 0.376" 
GOODNEWS -0.061 -0.127 0.336" -0.179 0.294" 0.074 
TOTSIG 0.003 -0.145 0.181 -0.385" 0.166 0.214' 0.119 
RelativeDOMSIG 0.149 0.269" -0.101 -0.056 -0.025 -0.192' -0.041 -0.053 
DOMSIG 0.096 -0.025 0.105 -0.344" 0.145 0.133 0.108 0.842" 0.394" 
FORSIG -0.144 -0.231' 0.174 -0.179 0.081 0.190' 0.051 0.545" -0.705" 0.007 I 
LIT -0.098 0.053 0.352" -0.101 0.194' 0.371" 0.202' 0.126 -0.019 0.089 0.095 
LOWGHG -0.029 0.105 0.273" 0.Q78 -0.003 0.306" -0.085 -0.145 0.055 -0.156 -0.026 0.307" 
SIZE -0.013 -0.109 0.265" -0.481" 0.227' 0.13 0.205' 0.469" 0.117 0.448" 0.173 -0.028 -0.299" 
ROA 0.001 0.221' 0.065 0.053 0.017 0.002 -0.046 -0.107 0.Q78 -0.123 -0.008 -0.037 0.328" -0.177 
LEV 0.053 -0.012 0.217' -0.326" 0.201' 0.047 0.191' 0.338" 0.117 0.364" 0.061 -0.096 -0.407" 0.708" -0.349" I 
TOBINQ -0.071 -0.114 0.025 0.046 -0.057 -0.178 -0.025 -0.157 0.031 -0.154 -0.052 -0.007 0.061 -0.119 0.303" 0.053 
CDPS 0.04 0.071 -0.155 0.102 -0.011 -0.308" -0.058 -0.046 0.615" 0.275" -0.514" -0.057 -0.08 -0.071 0.174 -0.07 0.233' 
CDP6 0.001 -0.032 0.172 -0.192' 0.193' 0.231' 0.018 -0.250" 0.031 -0.157 -0.220' 0.102 0.148 0.074 -0.081 0.004 -0.071 -0.345'" 
CDP7 -0.096 -0.052 0.132 -0.388" 0.181 0.336" -0.159 0.410" -0.416" 0.062 0.665" 0.09 0.031 0.163 0.056 0.088 -0.171 -0.38S"· -0.243' 
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Table 13: Cross Sectional Regression: Private Date 
This table lists the results from the cross-sectional regression where the dependant variable is either a three day window from the event study (CAAR (-1, +1» or an eleven day window from the 
event study (CAAR (-5,+5». Two models are given for each of the dependant variables. Predicted sign, the coefficient estimate, standard error and t-statistic are given for the intercept as well as 
all independant variables. SIGNAL is an aggregate index representing a fum's commitment to the climate change issue, it was created throngh a principal component analysis. INITIAL is a binary 
variable coded as a 1 for disclosures that were a frrrn's first time responding tu the CDP and 0 otherwise. LEADER is a binary variable coded 1 for frrrns that were classified by the CDP as 
disclosure leaders. FOLLOWED is a binary variable coded as a 1 for responses to the CDP that were previously disclosed through annual reports and 0 otherwise. GoodNews is a variable rating a 
fum's environmental performance. Modell and Model 3 use the independant variables TOTSIG and RelativeDOMSIG. TOTSIG is the percentage of signatory frrrn ownership. RelativeDOMSIG 
was calculated by dividing the percentage of domestic signatory ownership by the total signatory ownership. Model 3 and Model 4 include DOMSIG and FORSIG. DOMSIG is the percentage of 
domestic signatory ownerhip. FORSIG is the percentage of foreign signatory fum ownership. The remaining independant variables are included in all four models. LIT is a dummy variable 
representing litigation risk, it is coded 1 for all firms that were listed as defendants in environmental litigation within 5 years prior to being approached by the CDP. LOWGHG is a dummy variable 
coded 1 for firms that produce low levels of greenhouse gases and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural log of the total assets averaged over the prior two years. ROA is the net income averaged over 
the prior two years divided by the total assets averaged over the prior two years. LEV is the total debt averaged over the prior two years divided by the total assets averaged over the prior two 
years. TOBINQ is the firms market value averaged over the prior two years divided by the book value of equity averaged over the prior two years. CDP5, CDP6, and CDP 7 are dummy variable 
included to capture time effects, they represent 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. 107 frrrn year observations were used. 
CAAR(-l,l) CAAR(-5,5) 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Predicted Standard Standard Standard Standard 
Variable Sign Estimate Error t-Stat Estimate Error t-Stat Estimate Error t-Stat Estimate Error t-Stat 
Intercept -0.005 0.024 -0.211 0.005 0.023 0.237 Om8 0.045 0.855 0.058 0.044 1.334 
SIGNAL + 0.003 0.004 0.794 0.002 0.004 0.66 -0.003 0.007 -0.425 -0.005 0.007 -0.804 
INITIAL 0.008 0.008 0.973 0.009 0.008 1.077 -0.018 0.015 -1.210 -0.018 0.015 -1.158 
LEADER 0.007 0.008 0.912 0.007 0.008 0.934 0.017 O.oI5 1.148 0.015 0.015 0.998 
FOLLOWED 0.005 0.007 0.741 0.002 0.007 0.338 0.003 0.014 0.209 -0.003 0.014 -0.182 
GOODNEWS -0.001 0.002 -0.898 -0.001 0.001 -0.863 -0.006** 0.003 -2.021 -0.005* 0.003 -1.925 
TOTSIG +/- 0.000 0.000 0.575 -0.001 0.001 -0.972 
RelativeDOMSIG +/- 0.026 0.016 1.587 0.067** 0.030 2.237 
DOMSIG +/- 0.001 0.001 1.290 -0.001 0.001 -0.550 
FORSIG +/- -0.001 0.001 -1.075 -0.003* 0.002 -1.875 
LIT +/- -0.007 0.007 -0.994 -0.006 0.007 -0.869 0.022 0.014 1.659 0.024* 0.014 1.779 
LOWGHG +/- -0.005 0.008 -0.638 -0.002 0.007 -0.314 -0.003 0.014 -0.182 0.006 0.014 0.421 
SIZE +/- -0.002 0.003 -0.714 -0.001 0.002 -0.470 -0.01 ** 0.005 -2.144 -0.008 0.005 -1.643 
ROA +/- 0.025 0.064 0.389 0.033 0.063 0.531 0.429*** 0.118 3.631 0.439*** 0.118 3.711 
LEV +/- 0.009 0.023 0.406 0.010 0.023 0.453 0.100** 0.043 2.344 0.111** 0.044 2.547 
TOBIN +/- -0.002 0.003 -0.584 -0.002 0.003 -0.524 -0.015*** 0.006 -2.771 -0.016*** 0.006 -2.815 
CDP5 +/- -0.009 0.010 -0.947 -0.008 0.010 -0.868 -0.036* 0.018 -1.953 -0.024 0.018 -1.305 
CDP6 +/- -0.005 0.011 -0.489 -0.005 0.011 -0.471 -0.038* 0.020 -1.887 -0.036* 0.020 -1.749 
CDP7 +/- -0.009 0.012 -0.722 -0.004 0.012 -0.345 -0.036 0.022 -1.648 -0.025 0.024 -1.065 
N 107 107 107 107 
R-Squared -0.061 -0.062 0.164 0.137 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 percent level, respectively 
VI 
00 
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